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KI3RKEGAARD'S PROBLEM

AND HIS THEORY OF
EXISTENCI

by

W111i... Leo Kelly. S.J.

A Thes!. Submitted to the'Faculty ot the Graduate School

ot Loyola Univeraity in

P8~lal

FulfIll.ent ot

.the Requirements tor the Degree ot
Me. ster of Art.

FEBRUARY
19S2

2

rn

the time.

Germany 'riedflrich Schlelermacht:3r, an outstanding

Protestant theologian of the day, was emphasizing feeling in religion.
and

Religion tor him was had in and through the 1nrinlite,

."orytblng tomporal, in and through the eternal.

This pan-

theistic tone was the theologicaleeho ot Spinoaan philosophy,
which was

havln,~

its moat recent fling 1n Le ••lng'. l!1mlmRIE

and Friedrich Jacobi t • A~.~.~ D£'I'~YBi,
along with the wO:"ks or men like J. G. Hammon. 2

DE'IIlMEll••

H. L. Martensen, pt'oloundly influenced by Hegel, attemp.
ted a speculative theology which c.;uld mediate between rational1.

and orthodoxy.
lectic with

,Q

His attempt involved the Ufie ot the Hegelian dIadoctrine or existence

(DI.'6a)

by whioh he cou.ld me-

diate everything in the world which bad metl.nlng in e xlstence.
Hence nature and bist<Jry, poetry and art, along with vhl1osophy
would harmoniously unite to torm a temple of' the spirit in whicb

Christianity woulc be

~le

all-governing and all-explaln1ng center.

Martensen supposedly had removed all difficulti.. confronting reason.

Along with. Martensen the men of his time confused ethics

\#1 th contemplation, Cbristianity with abstract speculation.)

The influence ot

He~~ellanl_

on Christian! ty brought

about a Gplrit1ual bankruptcy and a perveralon ot the meaning ot
2 For a further consideration ot the philosophera mentioned above, Me Fr1erick Ueberweg,
.Qt. ~!~!Qf~' New

York, trans. by Geo. S. Moris, 1903,

J

a'VofxQH
.,-Y2

.-200.

John Bain, Seren Klerkegaard. London, 38.108.

J
<01

hristianity as it had formerly been accepted.

It was this Hege-

ian theology which was the pale substitution for the Christianity formerly held even by the Lutherans.
The philosophical prelude to this Hegelian field-day
ad its roots as tar back as Huma's subjective interpretation ot
eality.

Alter Hum., Kant's

ph~losophy

the German Universities.
Rh~nQm!n2n

supplanted the

aster with his "'Transcendental

I.1f

of apEiszt'. had been

F1chte. a onetime student or
and QoumenoQ ot his former
This "Transcendental

1"

or

"I-am-I" Kierkegaard satirized in his general rejection ot speclat1ve philosophy as the answer to his problem.

Schelling had

sen teaching radical indifferentism in which the real and the
deal were identified.

This indifferentism was perceived and its

otion was started by intellectual intuitionism.

Adolf Trendel-

nburg. who was a professor at the University of Berlin and a
7reat Aristotelian scholar, was at this time a severe critic ot
ant, Hegel, and Spinoza.

His objections to some of Kantts pro6

ed to prolonged discussions with Kuno Fischer, Professor at
ena. and other men of repute.

Such opposition to the German

of philosophy was not without significance for KierkeIt would seem that Kierkegaard was greatly influenced by
rendelenburg.

This influence is indicated in Kierkegaardts

The philosophy chairs and publlcationsot Klerkegaard f s

4
day wGre not the only sources tor dissemination ot the schoel ot
4l

Oerman philosophy.

The poets did their part"

too.

Friedrich

Schiller popularised tho moral and esthetic doctrines ot Kant.
~)aul

John

Richter, known for his dialogue on t.he immortal! ty ot

the 50ul. itumt1ntttct.U!l. val the tor.runner
ment.

or

the romantic move-

nichter was aleo a contemporary of K1erkegaarct.

Friedrich

von Hardenberg. known aa Noviali., and Tieck, who were 11kewiae
cont mporar:i.ee of Kierkegaard, were the more outstanding publi-

ci.era of romanticism in poetry.
t~mporary

or

much to the

Friedrich Jehlegel, another con-

K1erkeg,.;ard and author
~'5iii

or

L~2ins1!h

atter contributing

.g! &!tlitJal ultimrJ.tely turned to the Cat,holic

fa1th. 4
On Octooer )0, 18)0, S~ren Kierkegaard matriculated In

t.he

Uniyer~1t.y l;;t

laJd.dl.. 5

Oopenhagen aft.et" paasing hiG examiMtions

.ma.

He cbose the faculty or theology in oon£ormlt.y w1t.h his

fatherta w1:iJh.

His brother, Peter, had already passed hi. tneo-

logical examination in Copenhagen and Wf1a studying tor a dootor-

ate in O......any.

After a year Ki$rke,aarc1 passed the "Seoond Ex-

4 For further discussion or the ph1losophers, theologian. and rom8ntloiata 01 Ki.negaardts day ••e James Col11n8,
"The Spheres otlSxi$tenee and the Romantic Outlook" and "The
Attack Upon He€:e11anl_ t " Sfd1ij ~S}l.5lQ~' lVI, January, 1949,

~21-129.

And March, 1949, .

9-4 1

respect vely.

S 'or extensive biographical material on Kierkega4rd

see Via 1 tel" Lowrie; K,1, ~~Z:~!i'lim ,London,

19)6.

<01

amination'i't in Latin, Greek, physIcs, Hebrew, and h1sta:!:"}' with the

liuSI- .tn philosophy and mathem6itl08, he received
the cl'tatlon :LiMaIRill. Jl£U Q!5~.tlI. He was now a oandidate· tor

rating ot JlW!

theology and could take hls examination whenever ho felt. prepare4
But it was not until nine years later, in 1$40, that Klerkegaard
received h1u license to exerci88 the pastoral alnlatry.
these nine lears Kle;,'kegaard wi tn. s eed the death
4'ld

tat.l'U:u:·,

Ii

'broth<tr twenty-tour years old,

ty-three year$ old.

Mnd

ot

During

his mother

two slstera twen-

In lEU? at the age ot twenty-a8ven he became

engaged to Regina Olsen, who was then seventeen years old.
c:mga.gement

K10rkegaard broke on October 11, 1841.

The

This

NaGOn

tor

this decision according to K1erkegaard was that he did not wish
to subjeot aegina to tho inborn melan.choly 'W!1ich he inherited

froul h18 fatber. 6

Atter this experience with Regina Olsen, Klerkegaard
turned agti.in to .trudy and writing.!' It was Ludvig Keibers who

first introduced Hegelianism into the University of Copenhagen.
Heiberg bad atudled under Hegel and had a pereanal eateem for hi.
master.

But it was H. L. lI..artensen who made Hegeliani_ t;..e lead-

ing and r-.;.llng philosophy in Denmark.

.Martenaen t a attempt to re....

eonoil. Ohristian orth.odoxy .and Hegelianism in hl.

Ya&rM"&SI,

6
'"
Chr1stllR: Ethi2fh
and other works was ot pivotal importance for,
and an object of Kierkegaardts most bitter and sustained attaeks
against

philosophy as theexplanatlon ot

sseeula~1ve

Christianlt~

. Though K1erkegaard had admiration for Hegel·· he never
tired ot heaping invectives upon Martensen who. otaessed by
the fixed idea of the agel always claimed to go "beyond Hegel. To Kierkegaard, "go ng beyond ft Hegel was something
like living in the country·where one's letters had to be addressed .Y1A a big town. In this ease the address was John
Doe I!i 1Ie'gel.7
'fhis philosophy which Klerltegaard -studied was that ot
Hegel.

It was a philosophy of the Absolute.

This absolute was

regarded as being beyond the contradictory relationships which

were comprehended within itselt.
was neoessitated tor the mediation
alectics.

A eonstant prooess of evolution

or

contradictories through di-

By this logical prolression, the immanent idea unfol-

ded itself and became more apparent.
process was one

or

absolute indeterminism.

toward the determinate.
ans'\'l1er so concrete

TIle initial stage

8.

ot this

The evolution vas

Such a philosophy was hardly the one to

problem as was Kierkegaard t s.

a.s might have been expected. was strong.

His reaction,

In the follo\'iing state-

ment Kierkegaard hits at the core of Hegelian weakness.
We certainly do not need Hegel to inform us that relative
contradictions oan be mediated, tor it is already told by
the ancients, • • • but personality will protest in all eternity against the proposition that absolute contradictions
••

7

can be wediated (and this protest ia incommensurable with
the assertion of the mediation); it wIll in all etenlity 1"0peat. ftsimmortal dilemma: to be or not to be-that is the
quest.lOlh 8

The oo,sic d1tficulty or the thinking ot 1'11& age, according to Kierkegaard. was t,he divorce

or

11te from thinking.

In

Ancient Oreace, ph11030phy rUtd always maintuined a relation to

et:1ica. and a thinker wao "an ex1s1;ing individual atimulated by
his refl$ction to p~u:,u:Jionat. enthulldaerth,,9 --Again-'fhe difference
between Kierkeliaa,l"d,f s way of thinkine and that

Hi. 'day o.tt.h1nk:lng was practioel,

p!H;lrs ot hi. day is evident.

concerned wit#h the concrete indivldual.
found

In ;3ocrates lU.e:rkegaar4

He looked upon him as his proto-

For Kifu'kegaard Socrates was theex18ting phUoGopher in

type.
whom

thinker to his liking.

Ai

ot the ph11oso-

thought and living

kegaard' a aim to
~;hl"ist1anit1

un8

were

united, not divorced..

the Socratic method

might be united.

ThUG

$0

It we Kier-

that thought and

he WQuld not speculate about

Christianity, but he would Join Cau."1stian truth to the existenoe

of the individual.

'Dlis method Klcrkegaard considered directly

opposed to the logical syotams of the day.

~xistence.

say, in many ,,,ayts 18 the f"rustrat,lon of the

lOi~ical

Tn

he would

attempt to

Ii

19ji'!. rIo.

t'6;;).'-~'&ren Fa~rltegaard. J:q~,;,

trams. A. Oru, London,

;1;0

.
9 Ki,';f'k?gaard, cRfu,l!&iiD& U!fiJl'2~.i·iS .P2~If'H .if1
the Philosophical, Fragrusnts, trans. vIa tor ~wr?e, an 'liV
~n.
son, Princeton, New JersGY, 271.

<01

$xpla1n renlit,y.

K1erkegaard bitterly carioatured the philoso-

phers of his d&y by ;Jaylng that they were men who built enONOU8

castles but

~ere ~lemselvea

contont to live in shacks nearby.

Klerkegaard inveighed against HeDQ11e.nism not only because it lacked a non-oonceptua.liatic foundation but also beoause
it had

Ii

devasultlng ef.£*ect on Chrlstian1tl".The age was one o.t
.g1'er-Jthin~;

ftdoctrin11ing,n aa he put it.

a

"doctriniz1n~

manner."

had to be understood in

raerkegaard lronic&llly 3Ulmlled up the

situation well int.he f"ollo%:ling
also t):ad been promuleated as
Good alGthe Ue;:;elian • • ••

til

~ifOrdS~

"Ie

13

as if Chrlstian1tl

litt.le t:lyatem, it not quite

0,$

It is as it Christ were a professor

and as it t.he apostles had founded a little seientl.t"'iC$oci8ty~lO
Z~ot

only did Kierkeganrd. observe the effect which He::;e....

litAn philosophy had on Chrl;atiiimltl. but also not.d the influence
w1 Itch the protessors

public.:

ft

the un! versl tie. had on the minds of the

[lJ n our tune all Gtand in relat..1onhip with the protes-

sor" t.he Pfioteusor is
tessor

ot

t.h~

",euu1ne Christian.

And with the pro-

scientific learning. and 'with lea.rning came doubters.

OfAmli

and 'tl1th learning and doubtera c·me the ec1'luti£lcally learned

public. and then came per~ona ~ and £qD~ti • • • • ttll In such a
situation K!erkegaard c;)usidared himself a man with a mlssion. He
I

•

1

I

9
telt it was his task to correct the prevalent ways of thinking,
i\

and to reinstate Christianity to its proper place+
logy is Cocrates.

"My only ana-

My task is the Socratic task--to revise the

conception ot what it means to be a Christian.

I do not call my-

self a Christian (keeping the ideal free), but I can reveal the
fact that others are still less'entitled to the name than I am112
When Kierkegaard studied the monistic and pantheistic
philosophies of his day, he noted that the individual had all but
been lost in the speculative contemplation of world history~

Aa

an antidote to this way of thinking, Kierkegaard would present
his own qORernican Revolut&on in which the individual would be
the supreme interest and humanity in general would evanesce into
the shadow of an abstraction.

In connection with Kierkegaardts

reaction to the speculative philosophy and theology of his day,
it may be noted that he also revolted against the established
state religion, Lutheranism.

In this he stirred the animosity

of many churohman and the censure of his friends. 13
12 S_ren Kierkegaard, Attack ~eon Christenggm, trans.
Walter Lowrie, Princeton, New Jersey, 1:9 ,2g~.
13 For a systematized and classified presentation ot
Klerkegaard,'s objection to the philosophy, religion, and the manner of thinking of his day. the reader is referred to Jean Wahl's
collection ot extracts from Kierkegaard's numerous J2lU'"n~~1 which
cover the periods between leJ4 and 19J9, and between !84 and
If!S4. Etudes Kierkegaardiennes, deuxieme ed., PariS, 1949, 455-

56a.

10
"I

From what has been seen of the person at Kiark.gaard,
one might take him for an intellectual revolutionary who objected

to evtlt*ytldtlg and who was basically ignorant ot the thinking ot
man throughout the ages.

But from his

OHn

references in the Pas',"

script it seams that he had a fair acquaintance with the Greek
schools ot thought.

He mention. the

with the monism of Fichte and Hegel.

~lea.t'io

school in connection

He speaks of Plato-a theory

ot recollection when he treats of thought and abstraction.

Other

names such as Protagoras. Empedocles, Zeno, Plutaroh, and Origen
find their place in his pages.

Aristotle is mentioned when he

treats of the logical nature of the Hegelian system.
His acquaintance with the thinkers ot the Middle Ages
seems to be almost nil.

He seems to have had a general knowledge

of the major tenets of the modern philosophers.

He mentions Des-

cartes' Oo&il;.o.!..£.ii..l.!M! in connection with his discussion on
thinking and
t~nce

~xi8tif1g.

The ontological argument for the exis-

ot Uod is mentioned in connection with Kant.

But for the

most part Kit.irkegaard restrict.ed his discussion ot speculative

philosophy to that of Hegel.
versity of Berlin to listen to

He made several trips to the Uni~le

lectures.

His comment on

$chel11ng was t.tlat he was an old driveller, even though at first
he enjoyed attending Schelling's leotures given in opposition to
Hegelianism.

Kierkegaard did not limit his attaok to philosophers

10
From what has been seen

or

the person ot Kierkegaard,

one might take him for an l:ltollectual revolut.ionary who objected
to everyth,1:tg and who was /;)a$ically isnorant of the thinklru of

man througbout the ages.

But from his o'.-.1n retcrences in the :Pos 1;0

script it se._ that he had a. fair acquaintance with tbe Greek

sohools of thoUSht.

He mention$ the

\vith the monism ot t'ichte and t'l8,:;e1.

or

~leat.l0

school 1n oonneotion

He speaks of Plato' &I t.heory

reoollection when be treats of thought and aoetraction.

names fJuch as

Prot8t~Oras,

rind their place in

treats

or

hi$

Other

J!impedocles. Zeno. Plutarch., and Orisen

pages.

Aristotle is mentioned when he

the logical nature of the Hegelian syaten.
His acquaintanoe w1th the thinkers ot the I'U.ddle Ages

seems to be almost.D!l_

ae

seems to have had a general knowledge

o! the major tenets of the illodern ptll1o&oph.ers.

cartes'

qQil~2

thlnking

~il.nd

He lnent.lona Del-

last .I!iIi 1n connection with hia discusslon on

existing.

'lbe ontological IU'gument for tn& axis-

t<.\:uce of: God 1s montioned in connEu)tion with Kant.

But for the

most, part Kierkegaal"d restricted his discussion of speculative
philosophy t.o that of

Be~$l.

He made several torii'S to the Un!-

v&rs1.ty of Berlin to listen to che lectuns.

His COrmilent on

$o:08111n& was that he was lin old driveller, even though at first

he enjoyed.

att~ndina

Hetlellanislfh

Jchelling' 8

lectur.s~~i".n

in opposition to

LIFE
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Loy-
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"I

and theologians as such, but he even included in his total war-

r.;u"'o :11 $ own bishop.
Do~rk

nera in

tho Hep;elians have several times bet!tn on the
especiall, alter Bishop ll11yn.ter, t.o t~ain the brill iant vic tory of a;?eCulf;l tl Vf;\ thou:~ht.. Blshop r>lyna~l" has

warpath~

more than once become a vanquisbed standl)oint, though he
aea, to be doing very well, and it is rather to b$ teared

t.hat the tremendous exertion incident to the winning ot.the

victory has been too iAluoh Co;',, the u..t}v~nqu!$hed vletot's.J.4
,\'~ls

The abov$ cen:lure Kl11rk0gaard cUNcted

bIshop

because hQ tried to reconcile Chr1$tlQnity with 8:t)eculatlve liegeliania:'t.t.

In thtt

ml~t

ot

th\~

I)h11o£;)()})h1cal ilnd th'301oJloal fer-

"

mentat.ion propur to hi$ ti~~.\ Ki"~.t"kegaElrd set h1t1sl)lt ehe task

ot

up3ett.i~

opposelfthe

the 'dhale madam trend
3Y3tQmi'f

of

tll$ th~i:;tlliilns

at

Alon. h$ would

't4'lnueht.

and any othtU'''

)051 ti1an

which

attack ',liith 111:11ectics, but his di·:llectics\I;ould not be the neo"s-

sary evolution of 'the Ide.at.
roota in

~xi3tel.'loe.

j

:~(;'t.ber

He 'f,,,ould n.ot be

point:.; of dogmatiC thlitoloa;y. but he

his dialectio
conOr~H"'n:)d

wO~41d

ha·,. its

,,\lith thG intricate

·WOuld.3r:;),P~Hl::d:&e

the Indi vi ....

dunl ,'iuol t:le lnd i vidual' s:~:;ersonal relation 1;0 a.n ·all... lmport,:imt

tru:th.

His every

tlncier.l;'fOl'"

,"0 bi'COffi$

lvoi.1.1d b:::, to hring a $olution to his
.~

/

~roblem
R

I

t.

tU

as

.

.a :::?u·l~t,j.an.), lbe followi:l'\O" three ohawters
Ki,;ii:rltegaa:;~d

'

$aw i

t~n.d

&nswered

it.

CHAPTER II
KI~RKEQAAaDt

S

ri~OBL~iJ

HO'w '.L'O BECORB A

ClmI~YrIAN

To understand the philosophical thought of men like Bernard of C1airvaux, Pascal, or Saint Augustine, one must realize
that the problem which confronted them was a religious one. Kiarkegaard likewise had a. religious problem. l Kierkegaard states
his problem in the following passage.
Here is a literary productivity, whose total idea is-~
the problem of becoming a Ohristian. • •• But the author
has thoroughly understood from the beginning, and consistently developed the consequences ot the fact that the situation
is in Christendom. • •• To become a Christian in Christendom Is tantamount either to becoming what one already is, and
this requires reflection in the direction 'of i'mv-srdness and
subjectivity, or else it means to be treed first from the
grip of lllusion. and this c.ennot be done without renection.
The problem 1st b~ing in a oertain sense a Christian, to become a Christian. Z

Kierkegnnrd also states his problem (!learly in the in~roduction

to the Po.stscript{.

The objective problem consIsts of an inquiry into the
truth ot Christianity. The subjective problem ~oncerns the
relationship of tee individual to Christianity.)I To put it
1

Etienne Gilson, Beinli and 3QmS Philoso"tlerB, Toron-

"'0, 1949, 142.
2

~oren

II

Kierkegaard •

L.!owrie, 0xford, 1939, }+2-43.

-

..Ib.!. POil':\t .2l
12

-

~iew.

-

,

trans, Walter

13
<II

simply: How may I. Johannes Olimacus, participate in the
happiness pro~ised by Christianity? The problem concerns
myself alone.)

/ In the solution ot this problem in Christendom, the
Christendom in which he lived, Kierkegaard encountered confusion.
The Hegellans accounted for most ot this confusion; it consisted
in believing that to be a Christian was to know Christianity, and
that there was a system,

speculation, or a §W!gHta[ knowledge

Ii

through which it was po. sible to become a Christlan.J+

To remove

this contusion, Kierkegaard had first to investigate speculative

philosophy which to him was in the main Hegellan philosophy.'

,i

"

)

Kierkegaard,

P28~lcr12t,

20.

4 Gilson, !'It!!, .I.W! !2e.! PhiiosQPhetl. 142.143.
;

In his article

-the Mind or

Kierke~ard'

The Attack

Upon Hegelianls.,- publiSh.! in the ~2ee£D Sia22D • XXVI,
March. 1949. 22), n•• James Collins rna es
en~n these word.,

co

The important qualification "Hegelian" should be attached to each
of these terms (v,g_. philosophy, logiC; reason, and metaphysics].
Hence I cannot entirely agree with J. Wahl (Etudes k1erkegaardiennes (ParisJ 1938) pp. 174-175) that Kierkegaard's attack upon
idealistic philosophy is formally extended into a repudiation of
~ll philosophy.
Only when it pretends to be all-inclusive on the
basis ot identity between thought and being does philosophy tall
~nder Kierkegaardts condemnation.
But since, aside from Aristotle, he was unacquainted with any definite philosophy free from
~ cla1m to selt-sufficiency, lierkegaard is not oareful enough in
~istinguishing between Hegelian p'lilosophy and other possible
types ot philosophy. That there can be non-idealistic ways of
seeking a systematic philosophical outlook is rightly stressed by
p. Weiss. in oppOSition to both Hegel and Kierkegaard (so tar as
the latter leave some room for misunderstanding by his omission):
"Existen. and Heyel!- Phil.oSOPh Y and Phenomenological Researeh,
ifIll (Dec., 1947/, G06-16.

14
I1ThiatherelOre beoame my resolve. to disoover where the misunderstanding lies between speculative philosophy and Chrlstlanlty.ff6

!

)

It was not long berore Klerkegaard concluded that tor

his poobl. . the two, Christianity and speculative philosophy. wer.
irreconcilable.
tha t

H.![.~ellan

cent times.

He soon let

100S8

one or the severest attacks

philosophy was to. undergo 1n 1 ta day or in more reKlerkegaard's barbed condemnation

or

He(~el1an

lative phllosophy as the answer to his problem flowed with

specucunnl~

irony and stinging satire.
Speculat.ive philosophy achieves the triumph or understanding
Christianity entire· but it is to be noted that it does not
underatand 1n a Christlan manner, but speculatively, whioh
is precisely a misunderstanding, sinoe Christianity 1s the
very opposite or speculation. TBut wha't other presupposition can, generally spe"klng, C01ne
into question for the so-called Christian philosophy but thai
Christianity is t.be precis. opposite of speculation, that it
1s the f,QiraculouG, the absurd, a challenge to the individual
to ex.1st in it! and notd to waste his time by trying to understand it specu atively.Q

The

at~1tude

ot Kierkegaard reflected in

~le

above paa-

1s one 11ke that or the Imitation ot Christ when it says, "1
would rather feel coepunction. than define It. n9 To exist .s a
sa4:~.

Christian rather than detine dogma was Klerkegaard'. concern •
...

II

6 Klerkegaard,

PQs¥lcr~Ri,

216.

7 l!Wt., 243.
8~'f

))S.

See also 193-195.

9 Th0JU8 A Kemp'., .Dla 'g,AQI&D& .9.t Ctu:j!1i, I, 1, J.
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The following passage trom K1erkegaard clarif1e. hl.
stand on the problem ot becoklng a Christian.
tive point at view must be kept in mind.
the problem

or

r

Again the 8ubjeo.

For Klerkegaard it 18

the individual relating himself to Christianity,

rather than the iruUvldual having

profound knowledge ot objec-

8

tive truths ot Christianity.
The problem 1s relevant to Christianity. Less problematical.
1y 1n the formot a dissertatiOn! it might be viewed a8 involvIng t.he apologetic presuppos tions for falth the approximation. leading toward faith, the quantitative l ntreduction
to the decision ot faith. That which aceOrdlnglI would h.".
to be treated would be a multitude ot cons1derat ona, whicb
are, or were once dealt with by theologians in an introduotory discipline. in the introduction to dogmatics. and In
apologetics. But in order to avoid contu.ion, it is at once
necessary to recall that ou.t treatment ot the prabl_ does
not raise the question ot the truth ot Christianity. It
merely deala with ~le que'tion ot the indiv1dual's relationship to Ohristianity. It haa nothing to do with the sy.tematic leal ot the personally indifferent individual to arrange the truths of Christianity in paragraphs; 1t deal, witt
the cone.mot the infinitely interafted indlvldual tor his
own relationship to such a doctrine. 0

In the above passage .K1erkegaard speol.rles clearly that

tnt"

pro1.11_

or

Christianity is not one ot objectivity, one ot

measuring the truth ot
take. tor granted.

\

Chrlst1an1ty~

The truth

or

Chr16tlanity h.

To measure thle truth, 1n Klcrkeg8.ard t s opin-

ion would be the approach ot the speculative philosopher_r
'rom the speculative point ot view, Christianity is viewed a
an historical phonomenon. 'lbe problem or its truth theretor.
becomes the problem ot so interpeutetrating it with thought,
J1'hat Christianity at last reveals itself 8S the ete.mal trut.&
'1'1'18 specula ti ve approach t.o the problem is characterized by
I

d

J

I

I
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one excellent trait: it has no presur>posltlons. It proceeds from nothing, it ~5sumes nothing as given. it begs no
postulates. Bere then we may be sure ot avoidIng such presuppos! tiona as were met wi til in the preceding.
lind yet, sO::let?lng 18 after all lUJsumed: ChristIanity

is assumed as given. Alas a.nd alack' philosophy 1s altotooa polite. How 8tran~e Is the way ot the world'

~ether

unce it was the risk ot his 11£. that a man dared to protesa
himself a Christian; now it i8 to make10neselt suspect to
venture doubt that one is a Christian. J.
K1erkeg£iard goes at great length in his wr1 tinge to

tlrl~e

M-

the explanation 01" Christianity according to apeculatlve

philosophy, or more properly, according to Hegelian philosophy,
as may be
lam ot

~~(" thered

Kl~rk.gaard

trOll the tone ot 'the above pas_g..
was an ethical one,

Ii

The prob-

rell,ziou8 one \'ihiCh con-

cern. the reaatlonshlp of the individual to Christianity, Speculative philosopby. l,mdeZ"et.ood as a phIlosophy with no root. in

real! t1 independent ot out though't, cannot answer his probl_.
which ooncerns the exist.ing individual.

Speaking ot the PlatoniC

thElJory ot recollection, he puts it this way_
The recollection-principle belongs to speculative philoso-

phy lind recollectlon 18 bllWilnence, and speculatively- and
et~mally there is no p~l,radox.
But t.be difficulty 1$ tbat

no human belof is speoulative prl11oaopby; the speculative
philo$opher h flselt is an exlating individual, subjec' to
the claims that exl.ettr;nce make. upon him. 11:u'!tr8 i8 no merit
in torgetting 'Chis, but a great merit Inl~olding it fast.
and t.,h1s 1s precisely what Socrates did.

11

~.,

49.

12

Ibid.,

184-1S" see note.
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reference to Socrates in the above passage is typi-

cal of many others which Kierkegaard made to the early Greek philosopher.. For Kierkegaard. Socrates was the ethical philosopher,
and the model

ot his own philosophizing.. Kierkegaard likened

Socrates to a lover.. The early Greek did not merely know and

.

teach wisdom, but he was in love with wisdom.

Just as the true

lover is not one who knows much about love but does not actually
love, so Socrates was not one who merely knew about wisdom, but
he was the very love of wisdom walking around the streets and
places of Athens.. Klerkegaard compared himself to Socrates not
in wisdom but in the manner of PhilOSOPhiSIng./ To be

at

Christian

did not mean to have an objective knowledge of Christianity but
to be subjectively a Christian.. Since the problem ot becoming a
Christian is one of the individual. ot the subject, and not one

ot objectivity, Kierkegaard rejects the objeetive explanation ot
it.
Objectively, what it is to become a Christian is defined in
the following ways A Christian is one who accepts the doctrine ot Christianity. But if it is the doctrine which i8
to decide in the last resort whether one is a Christian,
then instantly attention is directed outward, in order to
learn to know in the minutest detail what the doctrine ot
Christianity is, because this indeed is to decidt, nO~iwhat
Christianity is, but whether I am a Christian • • • • [IJn the
end the decision whereby one becomes a Christian is relegated to oblivion.1 )
Once Kierkegaard has established for himself that Christianity has little in common with the objective standpoint, he
1) Ibid ••

'31.

1~
\

I

~

states what Christianity 1s trom the subject.ive standpoint_I

ffChristianity is spirit, spirit is inwtlrdn&ss, inwardne.8 18 aubjeetivlty, subjectivity is essentIally passion, and 1n 1\& maxi-

mum an infinite personal, pasaionate intereat 1n oneta eternal
happlnes •• "14 Now that Kierkegaard has removed Christianity trom
the objective solution and plaee'd it on the ground ot subjeotivity, he desoribes more specifically the nature or the subjecti-

vity.

"Subjectivity

cu~nlnates

In passion, Christianity is the

paradox. paradox and palaion are a mutual ri t. and thepaNdox 11
altogether suited to one i:/hose situat.ion ie. to be in the extrem-

ity ot existence."lS

In the above quotation the keynote or all Kierkegaard"
thoufSht i

sounded.

fa

The Alcibiadean lever with which he over-

threw the mass ot Her';ellan

thoUi~ht

and prepare the way or solution.

will now lay open his problem

That leyer, that keynote i8

6;Slstln«il./

Speoify1ng more clearly the nature ot existence, lierkegaard claims that nOhrlstlanl ty i8 not a doctrine but an e:.datential communication expressing an existential contradlction."16
To one asking what the nature

or

this contradicttlon ia, Kierke-

eaarei replies, "The existential contrad1ction proposed by Chris-

lit

1,

lJWt., 1).
Ibid,_, 206.

16 lbid., ))9. also 14, 290, 342. 49'. 497, 499. SOl.

19
tlan! ty 1. the one I have sought to f'onaulate 1n the problem of
an eternal happiness decided in time by a relationship to
thing historioal."l?

paradox.

This

.'ill'.

80m• •

'S the absolute

lU1tSU'ic"

"The paradox consiats p!"lncipally in the taot that God,

the Eternal, came into ex! stenee 1n time as

It

particular un. "la

.

In the '£111&.0\1 Kierkegaard aay•• "But the paradox unites the
contradictori8. and 1 s the hlstorlcal made eternal and the eternal made historical.

gveryont who understands the paradox dil.

ferently may keep the honor ot having explained it, lIIt.lch honor
he won by not beIng content to understand It. w19 The importance

ot this paradox Klerkegaard seta oft In the following quotation.
"The characteristic mark ot Christianity is the paradox, the ao.
8oluteparadox. ff20 The paradox takes ita existential importa.nce
from its relation to the individual.

wThe

par~dox

is altogether

snlit.d to one whose situation 1s to be in the: extremity ot exis-

tence.-21 1be significance at this relation Kierkegaard bring.
out in the following passa,e.
In (tomparilOD with thie direction toward the abGOlute. .Hl.a,
any and every .... sult, even it it were the realisation 0ltJii

moat glorious laney bom in awllhlng individual'. head, or
.......- - -.....,{,......IP!
...~hi
4d _,

l'

..

~

340,

.. 52S,

8110

)23. 3)0, )4?

also 529.

19 KlarkegaoN, lhl*QIQe!l~ lalUnti. trane. David
F. Svenson. Princeton, Rew Jers81, 19W,
79. In ttl.!. book
Kle.-kegattN devote. an entire chapt.er to the Absolute Paradox.
20 Klerk.gllull'd. frUUiIlE'Rx. 4~O

,rand

u leW., 206.
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in a poe\'s creative imagination. constitutes an absolute
loss. The striving individual is better otf if he thrusts
it aside and says: "No, thanks, lIt me rather keep my relationship to the absolute ~elql."22
Klarkegaard continues on, giving a further description

of this relationship whereby we become a Christian.

"Subjective-

ly, what it is to become a Christian is defined thus: The decision
liea in the subject.

The appropriation is the paradoxical inward-

ness which is specifically different from all other inwardness.,,23
The 2\hlt ,nwamU!11 to which Kierkegaard refers might be taken t!l8

that in the language ot a Hegelian.

It is the inwardness which!s

found in the third sphere of existence in f;e;ligiougDt!!!. It is
a type

ot faith which might

be rmd even by a pagan through

annihilation" before the deity.

"selt.

A further study of this inward-

ness will be treated in chapter four ot this thesis.

But to em-

phasise the nature ot the inwardness of pure abstractions, Kiarkegaard asserts: ftThe thing of being a Christian is not determined
by

the what of Christianity. but by the hQ'f' of' the Christian. Thill

h2! can only correspond with one thing, the absolute paradox.,,24
Kierkegaard adds:
. . . . the appropriation by which a Christian is a Ohriatian
must be so specific that it cannot be confused with anything
else. One defines the thing ot becoming and being a Christian

22 l.2,W.- , 356, also 46Et, ;06, 515.

23

Ibid. ,

540, also 191. ;39.

24

~.,

540.

S;ren A., 1.1erkegaard, who was considered by many as

juat another Prot.stant theologian ot the nineteenth oentury, was

.

not until recently deemed worthy ot muob philosophic study by

'orothe..a, 11erkegaard. was urely

proteaa1onal philosophers.

another modem tad nor

wa_

he studied eerioualy as were some oE

hi. Oerman phllosophio pred:ecesaora.
y •• r8, the

works

But within the paat t.an

at tbia hitherto unlmown author have been

apread1ng out. trOll their humble origin in Copenhagen. Denmark by
way ot 'rencb, Italian, aeman. and Engllab translations.

11erkegaard 18 ot interest both trom a philosophic and
a theological point ot vlev.

Philosophioally, be 18 now studied

in connectlon with the prasent movement called "existentialism."
He has been called the lather ot modem existentialism.

oriel bring to view such problems as the knowledge

or

His the-

reality.

the validity ot objective truth, and the queation ot existenoe.
He is a key figure ot tne nineteenth century as a .l"e"1110118 re-

actionary to the systematic apeoulative philo.cpoy ot Hegel.
Theologically, Kierkegnard 1s oZ concern to one interate<! in the Ll}theran notion of tal th as 1 t was proposed in the
ay when Hege11an philosophy had all but swallowed up Lutheranism.

1y
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not objectively by the ~ ot the dOQtrine, nor subjectively by appropria tion, not"""by what baa gone on 1.n the lndl vi-

illdividual bas Wlder~~one= • • • there
1. needed a spocific definition ot inwardness and appropriation whereby the witness ot the $plrlt in the Individual 1s
distinguIshed 2~ all other universally defined actiy1ty ot
spirit in man. :>
dual. but by what the

In the above text, Kierkegaard explains what he mean. bJ
appropriation ae proper to the activity

or

becoming a Christian.

It is distinct from all other appropriation such a IS that which i8

pro ;:01'"

to

knowledge by which one atter a t ashion ttbeoomes other

thing; •• " IUs appropriation 18 the volItional activity by which

one

moral porsonallty.

a$S~.

In becoming a Christian, appro-

priation tor Klerkogaard 18 the repeat.ed decisions by which one
makes himself other than he lit by becoming related

lute Paradox.
personal.
Christian.

to

the Abso-

Th1s appropriation of which Klerk$gaard apeaka 1a

It pertains to. the individual 1n hia queat to become a
The 1 t',;dl vlduallatlc aapect

ot this app1"'Opl"iatJ.on 1.

brought out in lIhe following worda of Klerkegaard.

Ohriatlanlty propos•• to endow the individual with an eternal
bappinG •• 'Whioh lanot distributed wholenl., but only to en.
individual at a tble. Though Christianity assume. that til...
inherea 1n the subjectivity ot the individual, as being the
potent.iality ot the appropriation ot good, the possibility

tor 1t$ acoeptance, 1 ••• , by volitional concentration on the
ab801ute t.elos in the highest degree , it does not .as1.l.lne
that the subJeotivity 1s immediately ready tor such aocept.ance • • • • It 1. subjeotivity that Chrletianlty 11 conOl!lDlld

with and it is only in 8u.bject.ivity that its truth e:d..te. l7
II

•

I

..

25 Ibid., 539.
26 This insert 18 taken trom the i!211(IQ r 12\, p.)S).
27 Kierkegaard, f2!lIs£&R~' 116, also 5)9.
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Kierkegaard leaves no doubt that his problem or becoming a Christian is one of subjectivity. It i8 in this subjectivitv
alone that truth is found.

It is not objective truth \ihlch i&

known. but it is subjective truth which 1& lived. Jolivet comments
on Kierkegaard) s consideration ot truth.

In his COllWent, he li-

.

kens this subjective truth to truth as it was in Christ, a 11t..It has been shol!\ll that KlerkegMrd rejects the epeoulatiY. or Hege11an way ;.,8 the solution to the problem ot becordng a

Christian.

Likewise he rejects the objective vay, or

strBot thought which gives

Oflly

\~y

ot abw

a specular knowledge of reality

as the solution to his problem. It i . 1n $ubjectiv1ty, one dletinct

trom all other subjoctivity euch as 18 found 1n thought,

that l{ierkegaard flnds the 801ution to hi8 problem.
j'sct.iY1ty

In this aul>-

ot inwardness one finds t.ruth. '.the rollowing chapter

will. lsive Klerkegaard' $ vlows on subJect1 'lit.! and truth.
I

11M

I

bI

aa Regis Jol1vet ID¥~qugt;'9f.l. X'ltlSi!58Hmt Abbaye
paint Wandrl11e, 194'. 10)1 Agans oute, lodtegaa~ prores.e.t;..11
qu t il ~'" a de verite :9our 1 f hOlume que dans 18 t subjecti vi tt.1, ,
C t eat-a-d ire que. loin de d iluer le mol dans 1 tin t.emoorel de 1a
p~n5e, ~bj.ctiv. et o.bstra1te. la philosoph!e dolt m\apporter un.
verlte a 14Quel18 mon ~tr~ individual puis" eommuniert que 1e
comprendrs,. do~ t eonduire a l' a:,ir. QU t 11 ne s.aura1 t su.rtire de / &6voir la veritA, mals qultl Importe avant tout dtetre dans la verite. 11 nty a de v'rlte (Jour l'indlv1du qu'en tant qu t ll 14 pr<J!o
duit 1\1.1...ome en agi8aant." ~~n srret, ltet.re "de 18 veri;e ntest
pas le r.doublaroen~ direct de l' etre rapports a' 1& pensee. Non,
l'etre de 1a verite a son redoubl6ln~nt en toi en mol. ~n lui, de
sort. que ta vie t 14 m1enna, ls a1.nne, dJ;jns i t effort 0\1 el18 a t _
ai:'proeho, est l'atN de 18 v'rite, comme 1a verite rut dan. 18
Christ una rlJi. oar i1 rut 1. verlte. f"utrerlllilnt d1t, je ne con.
nais en verIii que lorsqu'elle devient vie en mol.-

CHAPTER III
OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVITY
For 11erkegaard. as has been seen, the matter ot becoming a Christian is an existential problem.

It is one of subjec-

tivity,

A further analysis of the nature of this subjeotivity 1.

needed.

Kierkegaard explains it by contrasting it with objecti-

vity"
Objectively the interest is focussed merely on the thoughtcontent, subjectively on the inwardness. At its maximum
this ffhow H is the passion at the infinite. and the passion
of the infinite is the truth. But the passion ot the infinite is precisely subjectivity, a nd thus subjectivity be..
comes the truth. Objectively there is no infinite decisiveness, and hence it is objectively in order to annul the ditferenee between good and evil. together with the principle
at contradiction, and therewith also ~he intinite ditferenoe
between the true and the talse. Only in SUbjectivity is
there decisiveness, to seek objectivity is to be in error. l
Kierkegaard distinguishes here two kinds ot truth, subjective and objective.

If one 1s to beCOMe a Christian, he cannot

be indifterent to subjective truth and must be indifferent to objective truth since it prescinds from individual existence.

Sub-

jective truth is ethical and must be liYed and willed by decisiveness.

Objeetlve truth in itself is only in the intellectualcrder

1

Kierkegaard, P2stsctipt, 1~1, also 116, 173. 176,537.
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as knowledge, and is a mere approximation to reality.

It has no

reference to the ethical subject, nor doe a it in any way require
decisiveness or willing.

',,'hen Kierkegaard states that objective

knowledge annuls the difference between good and evil, the principle ot contradiction, and the infinite difference between the
true and the talse, he seems to mean that the validity at the
principle of contradiction, ot good and evil, at truth and falsity
rests on an exIstential basis.

The principle of contradiction is

enunciated in terms of being and ot!!ll'

Similarly the subjec-

tive aspect of good and evil rests upon the existing subject or
individual in his choices of thatvlhich 1s objectively good or
evil.

Likewise. the living of truth requires an existing subject.
Furthermore, a ccording to Klerkegaard, "the objectivity

.

which has come into being 1. from the subjective point of view
at most, either a n hypothesis or an a.pproximation. because all
eternal decisiveness is rooted in subjectivity,"2
The above pa.ssage contains three points which are ot
cardinal importance in the phIlosophy ot Kierkegf,E rd.

or

The first

these points is that tlall decisiveness is rooted in subjecti-

vity."

This pOint of subjectivity must be kept in mind at all

times when reading Kierkegaard.

It is a term which reflects Kier-

kegaardfs rebellion against all systematie philosophy,

2

It is e8-

Kierkegaard, PQst§criRt, 173, also 170, 509.
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'" theory ot knowledge, and it is basic to his consential to his
cept of faith.
The second point is that ot

~approximatlon."

Klarke.

geard considered objective knowledge and objective truth as

merely an approximation to the truth ot reality.
this, according to

Kier~egaard'8

lbe reason for

way of thinking. is that objec-

tive knowledge as such does not take acoount ot the human knower
who must affirm the truth according to his own situation in existenoe, nor does objective knowledge reach an understanding ot the
thing after its own mode of being,. a subject exercising exis.
tence in its own right.
tence.

Or

a8

Objective knowledge presoindl trom exis-

Kierkegaard would have it. objective knowledge ex-

cludes existenoe.)
Thirdly, objective knowledge is "hypothetical" acoording to Klerkegaard in that 1 t does not

c'~~ncern

any partioular

subject but merely a fictitious subject-in-general.

Since the

subject.in-general is not an existing subject, it is hypothetica1.4
Since knowledge which merely approximates reality or
~hich

stands on a hypothetiC basis is not related to existence,

it would be a matter of indifference for Kierkegaard as a soluJ For further discussion of the aspect of truth In
Kierkegaard, see James Collins, tfThree Kierkegaardian Problems:
'llhe ,Meaning of Existence," '£hI
3gho\a!td:9ism, nII, July,

~94e,

m

376.

4 Swenson,

~omethin' ~boHt

K&erkegaa£s, 10).
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tion to his '"problem.

Only knowledge whose relation to existence

is essential, ia essential kno\11l1edge for Kierkegaard.

The know-

ledge which has validity for Kierkegaard is that which 1s dirae-

ly related to the existing subject in the practical order.
For Kierkegaard, then. subjectivity is the truth. "Only
in subjectivity is there decisiveness • • • • It is the passion
of the infinite that is the decisive factor and not its content,
for its content is precisely itself.

In this Uls.nner subjectivity

and the subjective 'how' conttitute the truth. tt5
In the above passage, Klerkega.ard mentions the term

cisiveness.

!J.I....

It is read many times in his pages, and should be no-

ted as a caution to those who might misinterpret Kierkegaardts
concept of subjectivity.

Clearly it is not the subjectivity of
the "l-~-I" of F1chte. h"hiCh he condemns. 6 In general. the sub-

jectivity of Kierkega,ard had little in common wi1"h the solipsistic egos which emerged from the conceptualistic theories ot cognition prevalent in the nineteenth century.

These he rejected

because they gave a priority of thought over being.

Attempting

to go beyond the epistemological dilemma between idealism and empiriCism, he gave moral and religious sense to his term,

It hi.

;whought were to be placed in any tradition, it would better fit
into that ot St. Augustine,

5 Kierkegaard,
6

~bia.,

Kierkegaard well would ascribe to the

P2st!cr!i~.

19l, also 182-183, 226.

107. 108, 176-177, 179.

-
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proposition: '"is

il1tar1o~

heroine habi,ta3t

ver;J;:¥C\13.

A man' a sub-

jectivity in this sense is his personal, inward condition in respect to the moral law and religious life, a phase of reality
which is not open to scientific determination.

In this sense,

existential knowledce muot be subjective.?
In the following pass«ge, KlerkegaE\rd shows his stand
on the

dile~~s

proposed to him be idealism and empiricism.

ylhether truth is defined more empirically as the conformity

ot thought and being, or More idealistically as the conformity of being \t.1.th thought, it is, in either case. important
carefully to note what is meant by being. • • • 11' being in
the two indicated definitions! is 'u,nderstood as. empirical
being, truth is at once transformed into a d!Sidera£~, and
everythinr; must be understood in terms of becomIng.; or the
empirical object is unfinished and the existing cognitive
spirit itself is in process of becoming. Taus the truth becomes an approximation whose beginning cannot be posited absolutelYt precisely because the conclusion is lacking, the
effect 01" which is retro-aetive. \'ihenever a beginning is
made, on the other hand, unless through being awarE' of thiS,
theprocedure stamps itsel£ as arbitrary, such a bE;ginning
is nct the consequence of an immanent movement of thought
but it is effected through a resolution of the will, easentotally in the strength of faith. That the knowing spirit I.
an existing individual spirit and that every human being is
sueh an anti ty existing for himself is a tr'uth I cannot too
often repeat. • • • But if there is any lawful and honest
manner in which I could be helped into becoming something
extraordinary like the pure I-am-l tor example, I always
stand ready gratefll.11y to accept the gift and the benef'action. But if it can only be done in the manner indicated,
by Mying .!,!.Ih
iU:!1 kokolornm, or by tying a string
around thelitt e lnger, ':jnd then 1;\1'1e1'1 the moon i8 full,
hiding it in some secret place--in that caseSI prefer to remain what I am, a poor existing human being.

Iwe?,

7 For a similar explanation ot Kierkegaard's subjectivism see Collin
I'tThe Meaning ot Existence," 179. and Haecker,
siren Kl!r~!&al .• 27.
'
8 Kierkegaard, POjir't$cr;~$:.169-170.
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Th' above passage contains Kierkegaard's rejection
empirical knowledge as an adequate road to reality.

or

In this be

shows his skepticism. rejecting empirical k:loNladge as an ade....
l'1uate

representation of reality bocause everything is 1n the

process of becoming.

The conceptualism of the Heg;elians, whose

system requires a legerdemain,

!!a. !!!!,9t!1 kgko40tY!, to

start the process of movement,he like'wise rejects with irony.
Rejecting the beginning ot movement as the consequence ot an immanent movement of thought, Kierkegaard posits a resolution of
the will, "essentially in the strength of faith," as the lever

which gives J'llOVement to reality.

Here one can see a reflection

of Kierkegaard's religious background. one in which faith unsupported by reason was of cardinal importance.

1i:ore will be said

of faith in Kierkegaard in the following chapter.
It is sufficient'to note here that in the term

A~i~Q

K1erkegaard shows himself as the religious writer, the moralist. ,
For him truth is practical, always unfinished, and essentially
paradoxical.

This truth is concerned with the individual human

existent and his
nd natures.

self-develop~ent

rather than with general laws

Subjective reflection is ordained to a ,practioal

peration--to the cultivation of the self in its free relations
ith God.

Because human existence and its potentialities are re-

c-arded in relation to the infinite God, they can never be treated
s baing in a sta.te of equilibrium and rOlmded-off completion.

Because the individual is related to an infinite God, his existel'U)

29
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his continual striving will never be completo.
gaard excludes the possibility

or an

Henee Kierke.

existential system in con-

trast \ilth the loglca.l system ot Hegel.
System and finality are pretty much one and the same, 80
much 80 that it the system 18 not einlshed, there i8 no system.9 ••• A logical .x.tem 1a possible; and existential
syatem 1s Impos8ible.J.VV •• Nothing must then be incorporated in a logical ayatem that baa Qny illat.ion to existence,
that is not indifferent to existence.
In contraat to tlle cloNd system ot the logicians, Kiel'l
kegaard posits the ideal ot the existing individual.

nTb. ideal

ot a persistent striving expre •••• the existing subject's ethical
view ot 11te.-12
Thus tar Kicrkegaard. has explained hlo
objeotivity as contrasted with subjectivity.

C

onoeptlon of

He haa discarded

the objective way as the way ot truth because it i8 hypothetical
and

mer,,~ly

an approximation

tremes in the explanation

or

to

reall ty.

lie haa presented two ex-

truth, the idealistic and the empi-

riC, and haa i::iven his own explanation from the ethical standpoint-that truth liea in subjectlvit.y.

The following pa.uge

•

9 Klerkegaard,

f91~lir'Q¥1

9S.

lla.9... 99.
11 ,11&£1., 100.

10

12 lh1d.. 110. Furt.her references to "The System" as
viewed by K1eriiiiard may be round in the disoussions of the tollowing work.SWahl, ~!'1'f K't:l'~.'!D91I.t 2111 Haecker, ~
lU.erkEt&aard, 22, 2810
na,
e · 1'1 ng of" Qi,stence," J7~
1
dIlson, 51", ial ~ fh &'S6QQb"£I. 148.
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tty. But pure thcught is stUl a third medium, quite recent.
ly discovered. It therefore begin!l as the saying
after
the most. ex.'1austivG abstraction, ','he relation which abstract thought still sustains to that trom \IA11ch it abatraotl
18 eomething which pure thought innocently or thoughtlesS1I
ignores, Here is rest tor every doubt. here Is the eterna
p,0sitlve truth, and whatever else one trla:y be pleased to MY_
that 1S t pure thought 1. a phantom. It the Hegellan l>hl1osophy has emancipated itself from every presuPlfosition, it
haa won this freedom by means ot on. lunatic postulate. the
initial transition to pure'thougnt.1 ;

1.,

From the above matter it anould be noted that K!erkegaard does not apeak ot abstract knowledge as he doe. ot nap.ou.
lacive" philosophy.

As shall be seen later 1n the treatment on

faith. abstract thought, which is the objective way or whioh K1ep..
kegaaN speaka, ultima.tely will not be valid as a .:olution to hi.

$xist.ential problem.

But it haa some value in that it presents

possibility, the possibility ot reality.

The actuality ot this

poss.1bility 1s round 1n existential thought, in the relat,lng ot

the individual subject to the truth or Christianity_

Speaking

or

reali ty frOUl the ethical standr>oint, Xierkegaard explains why abstract thought cannot explain the existential problem.

Abstract thought e.braces the poasible, either the preceding

or the subsequent pos8fbili t1; pure thought is phantom. The
real subject is not the COi~nitiv. ~. ubject, since in knowing
he 1I0ves the the $phere or the p~l.aibl.l the real 8ubject 1s
the e thlcall,. exi$tini~ subject. An a b$tract thinker exist.
to be :.lure. but this tact 18 1"'ath• .,. a s,atire on him than
otherwise. For an abstract thinker to try to prove bi. existence by the tact th.ea t he t.hlnk8! 18 a curious contradiction; tor 1n the degree that he th nka abstractly be abstrcta
from his own exi8tence. • • • But the aot or abstraction
neverthele.8 becomes a strange sort of proof tor his exi ....
tence, since it it auce.ded entirely his exiatence would

v
To read K1$rkegaard without an insight. into his lite

and background merely adds contuuion to bewilderment.

To read

Kierkeeaard without patiently understanding his purpose or the
meaning he applle. to terms is likewise befuddling.

must be read not only in the

11~ht

ot

Kierkegaard

what one understands by the

terms employed but with some acquaintance w1th the philosophy
which Kiorkegaard had been taught, and wi t.h an understanding of
the modification of meaning which he gave to

t$~S

already common

in German philosophy.
Hot only must one be acquainted with the terminology in

Kledcegaard, but also with the way in which the various work.

were written.

His W'orks are mainly divided into thr•• types, the

e sthotl0, philosophical, nnd

mainly imaginative.

rell/~lol.u"

1".. esthet.ic works are

The first of this series, SilitU!E

/,2£.,

which

feii1;ued t.o be wrltt;el'l by Victor iremlta, presents two views
human lite.

ot

The one view 1s represented by the Youth, and 1t 1.

eathetic and amoral.

The second view 1a represented in the worda

ot Judge Wilhelm, and this view is the
ptll1o$ophioal worka the

F,aman's

ethioal viewpoint.

and the £g!l$4ugilli

or

the

\lDIS!sntWa

Postscript are moat representative. They contain tbe moat philosophical prlUJllnta tion ot Kiarkegaarc:l t 8 baaic thOU&Jht and have

§d&tx1o.I
Q&sSSHK!II. and the PgiDl Sot .u.a l2t !l

been uud as the priml1lry aources ot this thesis.

Discours•• I' C.b£~!~iIQ
ttlork

AI AD.

The

AY'tib2E are "1'"Sentative of his religious writing••
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cease. The Cartesian aOi1tg ~.
~ has otten been repeated. • •• But it the I i n o - - i s interpreted as meaning a particular existing human elng. philosophy erleaJ"How
silly; here there 1s no question ot yourselt or myself, but
solely ot the pure ego." But this pure .US!. cannot very well
have any other than a purely oonoeptualiilstence: what then
does the ~ mean? There i , no conclusion here. tor the
proposition-rs a tautology.lo .
The above criticism ot Descartes' proposition

.

ergo

s~

thinking.

eQgi~2

is Kiorkegaardfs fundamental criticism of all abstract
Not only does abstract thinking abstract from the

exi~

tenee oitha object known, but Kierkegaard would even have the
abstract

think~r

abstract from his own existence,

In the following passage, another reference is made to
the Socratic waY,ot philosophieing.

Again, Kierkegaard emphasi-

zes the ethical point of view, and distinguishes abstract

~;ought

from pure thought.
In Greece as in the youth of philosophy generally, it ~.
found difficult to win to the abstract and to leave existence, which always gives the particular - in modern times_
on the other hand, it has become difficu1t to reach existence. The process of abstraction is easy enough for us,
but we also desert existence more and moret and the realm ot
pure thought is the extreme limit of such desertion. In
Greece, philosophizing was a mode or action, and the philopher was therefore an existing individual. He may not have
possessed a great amount of knowledge, but what be did know
he knew to some profit, because he busied himself early and
late with the same thing. • • • The ethical may apeee Rome
restraint, 511'1ce it accentuates ex1s\ri)nce, and abstraot
thOtight and humor st111 retain a relationship to existence.

But pure thou[~bt. haa won through to a per-filet Victory, and
has notn1ng. nott11ng to .do with ,exlstence.17

16

~.t

17 .1hi.d ..

231, also 27S, 29), 296, 515.
2(,11) ...

II
Kierkegaard has been charged by some commentators with
being irrational.

'I'hat Klel'kftgaard was irrational can be att!rmed

and denied provided the proper distinctions be gi len.
1

Tho. who

would favor the affirmation ot: the oharg<-) \rould most likely

choose a paa.ge like the following one to subst.antiate their
cha~ge.

Abstract t bought, since 1t "ab.t.racts from existence, •

meritorious that it must. be regarded rather as rephrehens1ble. rt18 Abstract knowledge tor Ki(~rkegaard
• is ethically

80 little

had no ultimate and absolute value as

solution to his problem.

€A

In this sense he eondidared it reprehensible. and hence Kie.:{'kegaard

:8

rightly charged with irrationality.

the f'ina1 atage 1n existence, will

Kierkegaard'. ethical problem.

no aid trom r;t4S0n.

brlnE~

Ultimat.ely faith,

the tinal solution to

It will be a r.9,lth \vhlch receives

But it would be Inaccurated too brand. U.rk....

gaard as beitlg completely irratiOMl.
the worda. 'i:tr~Ui••X: mU:~liQ£lsn'l,

Inth. above quotation,

are highly significant tor a

prope... underet.and:lngot Kierkegaard f e way

ot

thinking.

To miaoon.true Kieckegaard' 8 thlcal, volitional, and
"dec1.1ve ft problem

a8

point ot his thought,.

a problem ot

knowled.~e

K1erkega," rd a dill ts the

Itiould be to mise the

lWi1

of abstract.

34
of this thesis,

"oJ

hen he SiiyS that the truth of Christianity i8

taken for granted.

The real problem is how to live it.

Treating abstract thought in terms of objectivity,
Kierkegaard distinguishes the
subjectivity.

~

of objectivity from the .!Um of

ffThe objective accent falls on ,,;HAT is said, the

subj acti ve accent on

Hm~

it is

s~1d.

• • • Obj actively the inter-

est is foccused merc:ly on the thought-content; subjectively on
the inwardness."l9 l4oreover. he asserts that

It

[abstract thought]at

its highest is possibility.ff20 Sinee abstract thought does not
posit an ethical relationship within the individual, it does not
solve Kierkegaardts problem...... the problem of reality, of becoming
a Christian.

The relationship of abstract thought to reality,

Kierkegaard puts in the f'ollowing way«
Abstract thought can get hold ot reality only by nullifying
it, and this nullification of reality consists in transforming it into possibioity. All that is said about reality 1n
the language of abstraction and within the sphere ot abstract
thought is really said within the sphere or the possible.
The entire realm of 8bstraet thought, speaking in the language
of reality, sustains the relation of possibility to the
realm ot reality; but this latter reality is not the one
which is incl\!ded within abstraot thought and the realm of
the possible. Zl
Again, Kierkegaard takes the stand that abstract thought
excludes existence, and that it abstracts thought-content trom

19

Ibi<\., 1$1.

20

Ibid.. 515.

21

Ibid •• 279.

'"I

reality and thus reduce. reality as known to possibility.

Hene.

he distinguishes the order ot abstract 1hought trom that of ethea!
reality, the order

ot human existence.

A &lore partlcular reason

ror this distinction aooording to Kierkega':irdta way

is that

"e~i8t.nc.

ot thinking

as a particular human being i8 not a pun

ideal existence; it is only

man~ln-general

who exists in that

manner, which means that this entity does not exist at all.

Ex-

istence i8 always something particular; the abstract does not exFrom this to draw the conclusion that the abstract is without validity is a miaunderstanding. n22
ist.

From the above pa ••age and tro. those immediately preceding, it can be fJe$n that Klerkegaard waa at grips w:1"th a problem that baa had great importance in the history

ot phUo$Ophy....

that ot universal. and the knowledge of existence.

".though Kia,.

kegaard ralegat.a abstract thought as representative 01 reality

to the world ot possibility. he neverthel ••• does not write It ot
&$

a ablntqm 8. be do.s the pure thought at the

He~e11ana.

This

in hi8 own worda would be a misunderstanding.

Klerkegaard wax.. most 84t1r10&1 in his condemnation

ot

pure thought and ,tthe .:.iyst_." the Hegelian philosophy which ws

tau.\r.ht 1n the un!vers! ties ot his day.
pure thought is 1n tJ;eneral
• J.'

•••

III

For hlll, -the so-called

psycholot:t1eal curios! ty, a remarobl•

36
"I

species ot combining and construing in a fantastic medium, the
medium

of pure being.,,2) Again, he denies the validity ot pure

thought by stating that "pure thought is a phantom."2J.., His satirical antipathy for pure thought as the antithesis ot a solution to the prd)lem ot existing he states in many passages similar to the following one.
Everywhere it is decisively concluded that~ought is the
highest stage ot human development; philosophy moves farther
away from. contact with primitive existential impressions,
and there is nothing lett to explore, nothing to experience.
Everything has been finished, and speculative thought has
now to rubricate, classily, and methodIcally arrange the
various concepts. One does not live any more, one does not
act, one does not believe; but one knows what love and faith
are, .nd it only remains to determine their place in the
System. In the same way the domino-player has his' pieces
betore him, and the game consists in Pdtting tbem togethel\2f
Again, there is evident the antithesis between Hegelian
~hilo8ophy
~ould

in its approach to reality and that which Kierkegaard

have.

~nowledg.

It would seam trom Klerkegaard t s writings that his

of Hegelian philosophy was not a very profound one baaed

pn a close study of Hegel's works.

But it must be noted that

Kierkegaard was not wanting in the fundamental retutations ot "the
System."

Those refutations he culled from personal experience

and from reflection on his own existence.

2)

PgstsS£iUt., 269.

24

~ ••

The concreteness of

261

25 Ib1g., 307-306; ct., e.g., 269, 27), 2SJ, 295.
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Kierkegaard'a argumentation bears out this observation, al may be

gathered from t.he follo\dng refutation whioh he ot!:'erlh

'W'hen an existing individual raises ~h. question of the rela..
tion between thought and being, thinking and existing, and
philosophy explains that it 1s one of identity, the answer

does not reply to the queation because it does not reply to
the questioner. Philosophy explain,.. "Thought and being are
onel but not in conneotion with things that are what they

are solely by virtue of ex:rstl ng, a 8 for example a rose.
which haa no Idea wi thin :1 tselt - and hence not in connection
with thinga that make i t most e l early evident what it meana
to exist as opposed to what it means to think. But thoutht
and being are one in connection with things who•• existence

la essentially indIfferent, because they are so abstract as
to have only conceptu.al eXIstence." To answer the qu••tion

In this DUilnnet> 1s to evade 1t; 1'01" the question had 1"eter..
t.o existence us a particular human being. An existence
of this sort is ot a dIfferent order from the existence ot
a potato, but neither Is it the kind of existence that
attaches to an Idea. Human 9Xi$t~nce has Idea In it. but 1.
not pure11 ideal exlstance. 20
~mce

The above rebuke to Ue,::elian thoU;;:;ht contains a denial

ot the identi ty ot thou;;ht and being. Klerkegurd also makes .it
clear that

exlst~nce,

though he treats it as subjectivity in hi.

own philouopby. 1. not an Ideal ext.tenc..

He likewise distin-

gu1sh.a existence 1n the e t,1cal sense in ;·hich he takes 11;, trom

existence such as 18 had by

lilt

rose or potato.

In other woms,

Klerkegaard' 8 approach to alstenee 18 not a Jneta;,hysical one, Wt
an eth.1c"'kl one.

The existential "alue

at

truth he repeats 1s the

tollow:J.ng cll.vewal of Heg.elian thouejlt.
aut a philosophy of' pu nJ thou;~h't :1 s ro1" an existing indl viual a chimera, it the t.r~th that is uOLgh t 1& something to
J

"rill

...

<II

exist in. To exist under the guidance of pure thQught ia
like travelling in Oenma.rk with the help of Ii small map ot
Europe, on which Denmark show" no larger than a steel pinpoint--aye, it is still more impossible. The admiration and
enthusiasm ot the youth. his bound.ltl. confidence in Hegel
is precisely the satire upon Hegel. 47
In speaking of existence in Hegelian philosophy, Kler-

kegaard states that it is a philosophy without a beginning.

"The

eternity of abstract thought is arrived at by abstracting trom ex-

istence.

The realm ot pure thought is a sphere in which the ex-

isting individual finds himself only by virtue ot a mistaken b....
ginning; and this error revenges itself' by making the existence

at the individual insignificant, a nd giving hi$ language a flavor

ot lunacy_naa This is strong language tor one engaged in so erudite and polite a circle as philosophy.

Nor can one help being

somewhat astonished a.t the outspoken manner of Kierkegaard when
he reflects on the position which Hegelian philosophy held in

Kierkegaard's onw day and count-ry.
One last quota.tion here will suffice for an indication
of the relation between sree,culative philosophy and Christianity
85

Klerkegaard saw it.

"Speculative philosophy, a IS abstract and

objective, entirely tglnores the tact ot existence and inwardness;

and inasmuch as Christianity accentuates this tact pa.radoxically,

27 Ibi\l •• 275.
26

Ibid. J 277.
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speculation is the greatest possible misunderstanding of Christianity.,,29
Before moving to the third kind of thought proposed by
Kierkegaard as the only valid klnd--that of the subjeotive. existing thinker, the reader may review briefly the main points made
by Kierkegaard concerning abstract and speculative thought..
Abstract 1hought since it abstracts from existence ia
inadequate to represent. reality as it is actually.

However. it

has validity in that it represents reality as po&sibility, and 1n
this sense retaina a relation to reality.
S'2ICM;Lat~ve

philosophy is mere

thought, or the pure thought of Hegelian

p~int2m

and worthless.

fhe major point of 01"1

ticism Which K1erkegaard levels at Hegelian philosophy are the
follo\dng; motion in Hegel is abrogated by pure thought30 or 1"ele
gated to the contines of logie; existence is abrogated by pure
th ough t; contingency and human freedom cannot be explained in
terms of human experience and existence along vdth the necessity

of the triadic evolution of the thesis, antithesiS. and synthesl.
and finally, the fact· that tUH!suJ;ati,V:1 philosophy has assumed the

prerogative ot making Christianity what it thinks Christianity

-

29 Ibid •• 507.
)0

For a fuller discussion

or

Kierkegaard'a reaction

to Hegel, see Collins, "The Attack Upon Hegelianism," 219-252;

also by the same author, ftKierkegaard's Critique
Thquib~. XVIII, March. 1942. 74-100.

or

Hegel,"

40
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ought to be.31

Atter one has seen Kierkegaard's views on abstract and
speoulative thought, it is proper to turn onets attention to that

thought which Kierkega.ard accepts as the solution to his problem.
It is the thought of the subjective thinker.

Kierkegaard intro-

duces his reader to the rubjective thinker by way of a comparison.

I1There is an old saying that arllttg,
th

o~m.

~entatiSh meg1"I~ig

:CIei'S t

Similarly there is required tor a subjective thinker

imagination and t eelin5h dialectics in exietential inwardness, tortether with passion. ff32 Already it is possible to see trom the
terms employed in this quotation and inclination toward the sub-

activism ot the faith in which Kiarkegaard had been reared.
according to Kierkegaardts Lutheran upbring.;..ng was one
hich stmred little company with the rational tradition of philo-

ophy, but which did take into account the emotional disposition
f the individual.

For the subjective thinker, Kierkegaard has

speeific task prescribed- that ot "understanding himself in
)1 Further discussion or the point:;} mentioned here may
e found in the following works: Swenson, S
thin About Klafk aaa
61, 96..118; \,;ahl, EtUd~ Kle e as
nn
S9-f72; Jol.
at, ntroduction a Kierkegaa!
; £. •
len, K!etke"f!ir.i.
Us ~ire ~ Thfught, London, 1':135, 62-72; P."ieiss, n2xlstenz
n
egel, Phl~oso~bX and p"lenOme~lO{:~ieal Resea£2h,. VIII nec ••
947. 206-216; ~. nlrch;-rierEii~a -~~4gtin, ~uttersloh. 1933,
I. nos. 1-2.

32

Kierkegaard,

P2stsc£~pt,

313.
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his existence.")) Kierkegaatd goes on to explain it.

"The task

the subjective thinker is to transform himself into an instrur118
that clearly and definitely expresses whatever is essentially h

man.")4 The personal aspect ot the thinker is marked in the fol
lowing\vords.

"An existential thinker must be pictured as esse

tially thinking. but so that in 'presenting hi8 thought. he skate
hisselt.");

The sphere of action of the subjective thinker is

dica ted in the following words,
a s

"The subjecti va t hlnker has on

Ingle scene, existence. rt )6 f<lore specifically this scene is

ft

wardness in existing as a human being, concreteness is attained
through bringing the existential categories into relationship w
one another.")? These existential categories will be treated in
the following chapter on eXistence; so there will be no further
discussion of thea here.

In connection with the relationships

just mentioned, Kierkegaard mentions another note which is char teristlc

or

the subjecti Vet thinker.

This note is that of retIa

tion stated in connection with truth interpreted in the subject! e
manner as understood by Kiarkegaard.

)3

Kierkegaard., Pgs'ti£tctiJ!t, )14.

34

Ibid., )1S.

)5

Ibig •• 319.

)6

lW·
lW·. 320.
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Itf moat.
~¥ot'ks.

or

the \yorks which preceded the religiou8

Klerkegaard used pSlaudonyms.
pcr,~ anal! ties

readers 11'ling

l'hu$ by placing betore hi.

\liho think

~nd

apeak ,Cor tJlfiaMl ve ••

Kierkegaard hoped to teach indirectly man what it. means to liYe.

By the p8eudoD)'IlB he also hoped teo avoid a title !IOat odious to
him, that.

or

P.t2ftsl9.t-

In an appendix to the i!Rlt,UtliSi K1erkegaard acknowledge. the authorship of the paeudonymous works.

"If'ormally and.

tor the sake ot regularity I acknowledge herewit.h ••• that, I _
the author. .a people would oall 1. t, of ifiltblE
~gpb~g~~ ~tlSlIQ'1

(Johann•• ClimaCUI), •••

19t&Q,l !2 1QI i!11&'9aabiilJ.

f.tUlfin1A1

I..Q£. • • • tb16a-

Q2Rg'~QADi ~

(Johanne. C11llacua)... .,,1

One further point 11erkega.ard makes olear concerning

or

the foundation

the pseudonyms.

Ny paeudOl'1yml1:'ty ot polynym1ty has not had a casual ground 1n
1Iy person, • • • but it has an ~IU%l~!I. e;round in the character ot the R£29"~Slh which 11.01' t.l~ $ ke or the 11nea
aacribed to t
au~ or" and thG psycholo?;ically yaP-led dis-

e

tinctions of the individualities poetically required COlIplfite regardlessne$$ 1n the d 1:rection ot ,;ood and evil, of

contrition and hJ,;;h Sr"'irita, of despair and pren:n,uaptlon, ot
;)utt"'ering and exultat on etc., which is bounded. only 1<le~1.
iy by psychological con&'llstency. ll:md which rO{.tl aotual persona in the actual ~lloral limitations of reality dare not per.
mit ti1em$elvea to indulge in, nor oould wish to. What 18
t.

f

I

I.

U
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When th~question of truth is raised in an objective manner,
reflection is directed objectively to the truth, as an object to which the knower is related. Reflection is not focussed upon the relationship, however, but upon the question
of whether it is the truth to which the knower is related.
It only the object to which he is related is the truth, f~he
subject is accounted to be in the truth. \1/h8n the question
of the truth is raised subjectively, reflection is directed
subjectively to the nature ot the individual's relationship;
if only the mone of this relationship is in the truth, the
indi vidual is in the truth even itcthe should happen to be
thus related to what is not' true .)0
It is to be noted that Kierkegaard in the above passage
again distinguishes truth taken in the objective sense and in the
subjective sense.

In the objective Bense. the purpose of our re-

flection is to establish the truth or falsity ot what is known.
But this is not the truth which interests Kierkegaard.

SubjectiY4

truth or that which one lives from the ethical point or view ia
his concern.

The question which is of most importance to Kierke-

gaard in this matter is the mode ot the relationship ot the individual to what he knowa.

In other words, the existential aspect

is the important one, and it 1s not concerned with the proof ot
objective truth as such.

To make this point clear, Kiekegaard

appends the f"ollo\dng note to the passage quoted above.

"The rea.

der will observe that the question here 1s about essential truth,
or about the truth v;hich is essentially r elated to existence, and
that it is precisely tor the aka at clarifying it as inwardness
or as subjectivity that this contrast is drawn. nJ9
)6

ll21s1~.

39

lW.,

178.

4.3
One f~hould note in reading the above passage that exi ....

tence as taken here is not existel'lCe in the meuphysical sense,

but an exiato:nce in decisiveness.

t'lJ'lCe..

Hence it is an ethioal exis-

',rheb one reads the word Itthinki,ng." he usually considers

it strictly as a purely IntellactLlal activity.

But for Kierke-

gtlard, the term embraces much mQr$-thinking. willig, and reeling in t.he composite of at-hiesl existence.

'rho term frequently

used by the commentators to designate this activity 1s

W&\tWI.

In Qttemptlng to understand Kierkegaardts stand on truth, on
must recall that his point

or

view 1s that ot the moralist.

i'''or

him. knowledge 1. valid 1t it 1s an ethice-religious knowledge
whoae truth lies in its very appropriation by the knowing subjee
Such knowledge does not a 1m to know the obj ect a s such t nor does
it aUt to know the objeetive truth about ita object.

even al. to kno1!l' that that with
true.

~.'lhlch

In this subjective knowledge

ship itael! 1s the truth.

it

.8t~lbllshe8

It do•• not
:relations 1.

ot Kierkegaard. the relation-

The only ree.lity which an exist.ing be-

ing ca.n knO\w othet"lda8 than through some abstract knowledge 1:;
his own, namely the tact that he exists t
solute lnt$r~st.40

This reality 1s his ab-

'the rollowlni~ pa::;MI~es trom K1erkegaard bear

out this interpretation.
I I

1'"

• k II

I

t

1

40 An accurate discus.lon of the ethico-roli;;~lous kno
ledge or KiQrk~gaard may be found in: Gilson, B,.~ ~~ PrAlJ.QIQlIlhltlh 149.
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The mode ot apprehension attha truth is precisely the truth•
• • •41 The subjectiye thinker 1s a dialectician dealing
with the existential and he has the passion ot thought requisite tor holding fast to the qualitative disjunction. , •
• 42 The ;3ubjective thinker i;5 not a man ot science, but an
artist. EXisting is an art. 4 )

The art ot existing for Kierkegaard is one of dialectical movement which culminates in faith.

But betore the exister

arrives at that peak, he must first make t1is way dialectically by
struecle and constant striving.

It is through the decis:Lons ot

the will that t.he individual exister moves through the spbere.

ot

existence tinally to become a Christian.

In the above passage Kierkegaard states that it is necessary to hold fast to the quali tat.i ve disjunction or distinctia
between the spheres of existenoe.

Here he opposes the quantita-

ti ve disjunction af tile Hegelian dialectiC J which is effected by
the necessary evolution at the Idea.

But any diSjunction or dis-

tinction to be attained in the life of an existing individual
comes trom the qualitative disjunction. that is, any change from
on~!

sphere of existence ta another is ef'tected by the deci.ivene

of the existing individual.
Kier'kegaard likens the subjective thinker to the artist
who subordinates and integrates the various elements of' life into

his life portrait.

For Kierkegaard, the subjective thinker, or

41 Kierkegaard, Postscrlgt, 2S7.
42

~b~a ••

J1J.

45
the artist of living, "is esthetie enough to
tic content, ethical anoug;b to

re6-ull1.~

~;1ve

hJ.3 lih esthe-

it, and d iulectical

enough to interpenetrate it with thought.ff~ The artist ot living
always keeps as h1s point or un1 ty the all-impol"'ttmt factor

istence.

If

Gt].

ot

e»

does not abstract tram existence. but lives it

while at the Mme time thtnklng.'

In all hls thinking he there-

fore has to think tbe tact. that he 1. an «lating individual_,,4-,
The point ot 1;h16 existential preoccupation for lU. erke-

gaard is that in this way alone ca.n the Chr1 at1M sol vo t.he problem of becoming and being

II

Christian.

"to

Llllde:"stami onesolf in

existent". 1s a180 the Christian principle, except that this 'e.lf!

has received tar richer and deeper determination. still more difficult to understand in conjunction with exi8t.~;,m:e."46

The last striking characteristic of the subjective
t,hinker.

'\It

hioh 1& all.important in the last sphere ot: existence,

paradoxical

rell{~1ouane$s.

18 that "the believer 18 a subjeotive

thinker • .,47 The subjective expression of the believer 1.$ faith.

autor. this treabnent of subjectivity in Ki$rkegaard .1s
the ma1ning
It

ot
•

r~lth

1n Klerkegfiard will be briefly conaddered •

I

44 Klcrkege.ard, Pgltlat4a1i, 314.

4'

19~i·

46

!Wtbig-

It?

eonclude~

46

For'" Kierkegaard faith is the maximum position of existence.

"From the Christian point of view there is no advanoe be-

yond faith, because faith is the highest stage for an existing in
dividual. ft4a In relation to the absolute t!lQ!, already considers
faith is the "collision of finite and intlnite."49 Defining faith
by its object, K1erkegaard says,. "For the absurd 1s

~le

object ot

faith and only object that can be believed.";O To specify more
thisobjeot of faith, "The absurd," he says, "is that the eternal
truth has come into being in time."sl In relation to the intellec
faith is the "crucifixion

or

the understanding."s2 But the oruci-

fixion of the understanding, unintelligibility 1s not enough tor
the existential philoi30pher.

"Faith must not rest content with

unintelligibility; for precisely the relation to or the repulsion

from the unintelligible, the absurd, is the expression for the pI.
sion of faith.";) Kierkegaard defines the passion

following manner.

ot faith in the

"Faith is the objective uncertainty due to the

repulsion ot the absurd held fast by the passion of inwardness.

4$

Ibid.,

2;9.

49

t.hid .,

208.

50

Ibid II J 189.

51

IbiQ., 199.

52

Ibisi., 4f!9.

53

Ibid •• 540.

47
which in

thi~in5tance

is intensified to the utmost degree. This

formula fits only the believer. no one else, not a lover, not an
enthusiast, not a thinker, but

s~p11

the believer who is related

to the absolute paradox. n54
Kierkegaard now

distint~ui shes

thi s passion of tal th

from the passion of other spheres of the exister.

"Faith is a

sphere for itself which, paradoxically distinguished trom the
esthetic and metaphysical, accentuates existence, and paradoxical
11 distinguished from the ethical, a ccentuates the existence ot

another person, not onets own eXistence. n; ; The existence ot the
other person referred to here is the ecistence of the !!tsutd.
To tie faith more closely with his problem ot becoming
a Christian, Klerkegaard gives the ultimate speCification ot the
object

or

faith. "Well, it is

perf.o~y

true that Christ i8 the

object ot faith.,,56 Thus the ultimate ph.a. in becoming a Christis.n is faith, whoae object is the Ood-man.
Again it may be noted that in Klerkegaard t s conception

at faith there is no room for the company of reason.
the final sphere of existence excludes reason.

Faith in

A further crit i-

eiam ot Kierkegaardfs notion of faith will be given in Chapter V

54

Ibis;l., 540.

55

~.,

514.

56 Ibig., 530.
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of this thesis.
By way or cJnclusion of this chapter on subjectivity.
the qualities of the subj ecti va thinker may be

following manner.

Sl.:UlliliSd

up in the

The subjective thinker is one whose task is to

transform himself into an instrument that clearly expresses in
e.xistence whatever is essentially human.
wardness is required.

For him existential in-

Essential knowledge for the subjective

thinker is all knowledge which is related to existence.

TIle mode

by which the existential thinker a.pprehends truth is precisely

the truth.

He is not a scientist. but an artist Who integrates

in his life portrait all the essential elements of human life.
The subjective thinker is a believer for whom faith 18

the highest stage of existence.

His faith is a

G21J:~f.\;1Qa wit.h

the infinite. which is referred to as the Rbsolute telSR, or end

ot all the subjective thinker's striving. Specifically, the absurd is the eternal truth, who has come into being 1n time.

Fait

renders reason unintelligible and has its expression in the passion resulting from the relation to or the repulsion from the ab-

surd.

Faith accentuates existence and is paradoxically distinct

from the ethical sphere of existence in that it accentuates not

its own existence, but that of i:"mother.

of the God-man, Christ.

This Pother is the person

Hence faith has as it2 object Christ.

This sphere ot existence is the ultimate stage in becoming a
Christian.

49
Faith hae been seen here to be the highest sphere ot
existence.

It is now apropos to treat

or

the spheres of ex!a-

tene.which are preparatory and subordinated to this

r1n~1

sphere

The treatment ot the spheres ot existence will follow immediately

in the

n~xt

chapter.

CHAPTER IV
THREE STAGES OF EXISTENCE
To appreciate adequately Kierkegaard's theory ot existence, one must always keep in mind his point ot vie".

It is not

that ot the metaphysician nor that ot the logician, but that of
the subjective thinker.

Consequently, his explanation ot exis-

tence will be in the realm ot the ethical for the most part since
he has clearly rejected any idealistic explanation

or

existence.

Lest the subjective point ot view startle whose who are accustomed to viewing reality always from the objective point ot view,
it .might be noted
by

that Jacques Yiaritain thinks that the intuitio

which Kierkegaard evolved his theory of existence is the same

as that which is at the heart ot Thomls.m.. the intuition ot the abo
solutely singular value and primacy ot the act ot eXisting, and
ot existence as exercised. l
The active aspect of existence Kierkegaard brings out it
/

1 Jacques Maritain, Court traite de l'existenee et de
l'existant, Paris, 1947. 208. "Nous croyons que l'intuition centrale dont vivait l'existentialisme d'un Kierkegaard etait en fin
de comte celle
qui est ~u coeur du thomisme,~l'intultion de
1. valeur absolument singuliere det de 1a primaute de ltexister,
de l'existen¥~8; YA exerclta."

mem.

50

51
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the following passage.
Existence itself~ the act ot existing, is a striving, and is
both pathetic and comic in the same degree. It is pathetic
because the striving is infinite; that is, it is directed
toward the infinite. being an actualization of infinitude, a
transformation which involves the highest pathos. It is CQmic because such a striving involves a self-contradiction. z
In his treatment of truth Kierkegaard asserts, as has

.

been seen, that abstract thought, the second medium. abstracts
from existence.

But existence, the first medium, "has combined

thought and existence by making the existing individual a
This combination ot thought and existence in the sub-

thinker. It)

jective thinker is effected by decisiveness. or will-action,
since decisiveness is precisely the act of the subjective thinker
Hence the union of thought and existence in the existing thinker
constitute the existential relation ot ethical truth in the subjective thinker.

Kierkegaard reters to this moment or choice

which is repeated again and again in the dialectical movement
toward faith.

ffReality or existence is the dialectical moment of

a trilogy, whose beginning and whose end cannot be for the existing individual. sinee qua existing individual he is himself in
the dialectical moment. nit Kierkegaard then connects the concept.
2 Postscript, 84.
:3

~.,

271!.

4. lW.., 279.
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written therefore i8 in tact mine, but only 1n ao tar as I
put into the mouth or the poetically actual Individuality 2
whom I produced, hie life-vie", expressed in audible line ••

Though K10rkegaard would seem to give the impression
t.hat the

tbOUt~ht.

represented in the

~:()l'd6

ot the pseudonymou8

author. are not his personal t.h.;:;ughta, nor a reflection ot hi.
own life. the facts ot

hlt~

111•. would seem t.o lndlcat.e tbe con-

".'ou1d ."foid the

ot the pseudonyms was a t"011 by which he
char,. ot indoctrinating tJ:le pub11.c with his per-

sonal theories.

ae took it upon h1.11".11 to show man how a Chris-

trary.

.Perhaps the use

tian should liYfh

He did not wish to do thie directly, but ra-

ther incliree'ly by presenting ideally people 'Who express their
tfnu.L~hta

for themselv$8.

,6y aeeing how t.hey thought. and lived,

perhaps his readers 'Would follow their example.

In tht. way,

Kierkegurd could lnd.1reotly communioate to bls readers the wa1
to 11v,8 wit.bout being oa.lled fC9(15Uier-

lb. purpose or this thesis 10 to give. logical pr••• r~
tation ot t.be philosophy of
exeget.ical.

K.iorkeg~.u''d.

'i'he procedure will be

The passage. which beet expla1tl the: various l>olnta

or 'lerk.gluard'. doot.rine have been taken trom

ulan)"

plaoe. in his

two most pll:tloso£:ihio _Titing_, the UaS9DIlwitrli 2Si'El5:~"Q Pill-'

sqript. and the ~h"9I.2M'Q
•

'mRmel •
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of existence and decision while speaking of movement.

"The goal

of movement for an existing individual is to arrive at a decision

and to renew it."'

Again, Kierkegaard puts movement out of the sphere of
the metaphysical as such, a nd into the ethical. because his problem is not one of becoming as such, but one of becoming a Christian.

From the Christian point of view as Kierkegaard sees it.
subjectivity culminates in passion, Christianity is the paradox, paradox and passion are a mutual fit, and the paradox is altogether suited to one whose situation is, to be in the
extremity of existence •• , The existing individual has by
me ,ns of the paradox itself come to be placed in the extremity ot existence. 6

Here Kierkegaard joins the problem of becoming a Christian \vith
the problem of existence.
Aierke~aard

'l'he

explanation ot existence which

will give, will be the explanation of his basic prob-

lem of becoming a Christian.

By introducing the note ot consciousness, Kierkegaard's
explanation ot existence moves in the direction or the ethical.
"But really to exist, so as to interpenetrate one's existence witli
consciousness, and yet also present in existence and 1n the process

or

becoming: that is truly difficult."?

The difficulty

arise. trom the making ot a choice and its renewal.

Just as Kier-

keg.aard t 8 con sidera tion wa s inadequate in that he wa a not formally
concerned with ontological or with logical truth as such,

6 Ibig_, 206.
?

Ih1d

?'7"l

53
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but rather with an ethico-religious truth as the explanation ot
his problem, so too, his concept ot real! ty
tern.

i~ollows

the same pat-

"The only reality that exists for an existing indIvidual

is his own ethical reality • • • The real subject is not the cog....
nitive subject. since in kno'l'ling he moves in the sphere ot the
possible; the real subject is tbe ethically exising subjeet. ffS It

would be a hasty step to take this statement as the basi. tor a
rejection by Kierkegaard of all reality outside the existing subject.

Kierkegaard is interested in ethical existen<le essentially

but as was seen in the previous chapter. he does admit the existenee at other things in

reality.

Ho>..rever, the existence ot

things such as a rose is not an ethical existence and consequent-

ly of little interest to Kierkegaard.

In accord with his entire position on subjectivity,
Kierkegaard asserts that "to exist essentially is inwardness.'·9
Since existence is the reality of the ethical individual, exist
is thesp;1ere of his determination and growth.
/

Aa a conaequence ot having made a decision 1n existence, the
existing individual has attained a more specific determlnatien ot what he is; if he lays it aside, then it is not he
who has lost something; he does not h:; va him.self while ha,....
paning to have lost something, but18e has lost himself and
must now begin trom the beginning.

8 Pgs'¥ser1Qt' J 280-2g1.
9

10

IbiQ"

3fHt.

.D1!sl., 437.

;4
This statemtnt of Kierkegaard mora clearly IJpecl.fi&.
\';ha t was referred to in a previous ohapter as the e trJ.enlor

rQO

pr.,:rsonall ty 01" the existing i,ndl vidual "... ho is hi. actions involving choice.

Nor does one acquire this personality by a .ere

single choice. \,

"[EJxiat~nce 1s not an abstract spurt but a

steady striving 'and conttnuou$ moam.;hile."ll 'fh1s striving tor
;aerkegaard lethe "process of becoming. ft12 This bocoming i6 the
dislec't;1cal movement
point in

Qxi!lt~nc"h

ot

the individual t.oward fa! th, the highest

One of the more subtle charact.eristica which

Kiorkegaard attributes to existence 1$ that it is a "sjlnthesis of
the infinite and thf;} firute and the ex13tin; individual is both

tlnite and

inrirli.tel~l.l To interpret

th,i8 statement, one cannot

f

irrunedintoly jump

1;0

tho conclusion that. it

ia

some torm. ot pan-

theism. be'Otluse Kierkegaard goes to 3reat trouble in rejecting
medlatlonoetwclen. the exiating individual and the fantastic
1-am-1.14 Rather thlfl finite and infinite aspect or the individual
must be expls.ined in term. of willing Md eternal happiness.
All rt:llatlve volition 18 marked by willing something tor the
aake ot SOiAething else, but tl'18 h.1.gheat end must be willed.
tor ita own StlKe. And this
ghe.t. end 1s not a particular
something, tor then it would be relative to Gomethlng other
U 1

11

~.,

469.

12 ;t"1~ •• 517.
13 12151-, );0.

14 lRi4., 176-177.
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and be finite. It is a contradiction to will something finite absolutelYt since the finite must have an end, so that
there CO!l'i6S a tlme "When it can no longer be willed. But to
will absolutely is to will the infinite, and to will an ete~
nal happiness is to will absolutely, because this is an end
which can be willed every moment. l )
Kierkegaard expresses infinitude here in terms of the
volitional, the existential.

He makes it clear that it is not a

question ot distinguishing the finite from the infinite but it is
,1

a question ot existence. l\It is the existence of the individual

always and repeatedly to will an eternal happiness.

In this sens

the individual, a finite creature, is also infinite because his
,/

willing ot the inirinite happiness will have no !end.
I

Kierkegaard

brings out this distinction more clearly in connection with the
question of mediation.

III

Hegelian term for the reconciliation of

opposites.
But when the scene is in existinv: and not on pa.per, the madi
ating individual being an exi~t individual (and thereby
prevented trom mediateing), then any individual who becomes
conscious of what it means to exist (that he exists) will
instantly become an individual who distinguishes absolutely,
not between the finite and the infinite, but between existing fini tely and existing tntini tely. For the tinite and
the intinite are put together in existence, in the existing
individu.al. l 6
This synthesis
permanent state at which

or
OLe

the .fInite and the Inl'init6 is not.a
arrives through a single act.

On

the contrary, "it is only momentarily that the particular indi-

15

~bia.t

353.

16 .!.!lisi. J 375.
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are three stages: an esthetic J anethieal, and a

reli~~iou$.

But

these are not distinguished abstractly, as the immediate, the mediate and the synthesiso! the two, but rather concretely, in existe;;tial determinations as enjoyment-perdition; action-victory;
suffering. n19 These stages according to Kierkegaard are not completely independent of one anotl;ler, but they have a mutual relation in the growth of the existing indididual.
But in spite ot this triple division the book is nevertheles
an either-or. The ethical and the religious stages have in
tact an essential relation to one another. The difficulty
with Either-Or is that it was rounded out to a conclusion
ethically • • • • In Either-Or the esthetic standpoint is represented by means at an existential possibility. while the
ethicist 1s existing. Now the esthetic is existential; the
ethicist 1s militant. fighting !naif11CS! ~rae~g against the
esthetic. over whiCh he again rea
y ga ns
e victory, not
by means'ot the seductive gifts of the intellect, but with
ethical passion and pathos; he seeks to d ·efend hUlaelf
against the religious. In rounding out his pOSition as an
et';ici.st" he does his utmost to dete nd himself against the
deciSive form ot higher standpoint. That he should defend
himself 1s quite in order, :3ince he is not a standpoint but
an existing individual. 20
From the above passage, one gets a glimpse of the stag(.)s Kierkegaard would :',ave the individual go through to become a
Christian.

What Ki::;rkegaard says here is somewhat si;iiilar to

what one f'requtintly hears in terms of' asceticism.

A person who

is bent on attaining perfection will often strive against what is
called his lower self. the self which seeks enjoyment and which

19

Post.!cx;'i2~..

20

Ib1i., 261-262.

260.

;8
tries to rationalize everything he does.

He wants to regulate

his life as a good one. yet he fears and in a way fights against
the higher standpoint of perfection which involves sutfering.
This experience can be shown to be the ease in the lives ot most
men.
For Kierkegaard. the first stage is that
of the intellectual approach to life.

or

possibilit1J

at is not concerned with

living the truth but with grasping truth intelleotually and imaginatively.

Hence its criterion of action is not whether this is

good or evil, but rather whether this truth is grasped intellectually.

The truth which the esthetic individual grasps is re-

duced to a possibility

\tJ

lieh in the ethical sphere may become for

the existing individual an actuality.
In connection with the e sthet!c and the intellectual,
re~,lly ha.s
happened, is a misunderstanding. So to ask betrays a £ailure to ConCEd va the esthetic and the indellectual ideali ty
as a possibility, and forgets that tadetennine a scale ot
values for the esthetic and the intellectual in this manner,
is 11ke rank1ng sensation higher than thoughtl Ethically it
is correct to put the question ffIs it real?" But it is important to note that this holds true only when the individual subject asks this question of hims~l.rl and concerning
his o~m re£;.lity. He can a.pprehend the 8th cal reality of
another only by thinking it. and hence as a possibillty.21
to ask whether this or that is real. whether it

/ For Kierkegaard it is not enough for the individual to
have and idea ot hi s eternal ha'piness in order to be existing in
the real sense of the lilord.

21

Itli~ ••

266.

The conceptions of eternal happiness
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and of the final end

tiO

Kierkee;aard merely meant the possibility

of change in the individual.

This change or tr<.::.nstormation occur

when the individual relers such a conception to himself

:30

that

makes it his chief concern to st!'i va 'Y/ith inwardness and pathos
relate himselt to that for 1;:hich the concept stands,

Klerkegaard

!

puts it in the following words.'
In the relation to an eternal happiness as the absolute good
pathos is not a metter of words, but of pennittlng this conception to transform the entire exist.enee of the individual.
Esthetic pathos expresses itself in \'lords, and may in its
truth indicate that the individual leaves his real self in
order to lose himself in the Idea; while existential pathos
is preJEmt whenever the Idea is brought into relation ,dth
the existence ot the individual so as to transform it. 1£ i
relating i tsel! to the Indi "J'idual t s existence the absolute
teloe fails to t ransi'orm it absolutely, the relationship 1s
not one of existential pathos, but of esthetic pathos. TIle
individual l'IlSY. for instance, have a correct conception, by
mea.ns ot "¥'1hlch he is outside himself in the ideality of the
possible, not with himself in eXistence! having the correct
conception in the ideality ot the :':ctua l himself in. procf)Ss
of being transformed into the ideality or the conception. aZ

Again Kisckegaard makes the point that to have a concep
of eternal happiness is not to be existentially related to it.
'rhis relation must be established by decision.

It is ltke the

difterence between love a.s depicted by the lDetJ which is in the
sphere of ideal1 ty ,alone.

.F'or the actual lover love means choice

Another statement of Kierkegaard brings out the distinction between the ethical Bflhere of a.ctua.l! ty and the esthetic sphere

possibility.

ot

60
.0;

For an existing individual the concept of an eternal happiness is essentially related to his mode ot existence, and
hence to the ideality of the actual; his pathos must be correspondingly qualified. If we conceive love esthetically,
we must acknowledge the principle that the poet's ideal of'
love may be higher than anything that reality presents • •
• • The pathos of the poet 1s therefore essentially imaginative pathos. An attempt to establ1sh a poetic relationship
to reality is thererore a misunderstanding. • • • Esthetical
11 it is the poetic producl;ivity which i, essential, and the
poet's mode ot existence is accidental. a)
Kierkegaard formulates what has been said above into a
principle. "The esthetic and intellectual prinCiple is that no re
ality is thought or understood until its

~s!e

has been resolved

into 1ts 22sS8. • • • But esthetically and intellectually tile
ideality is the possible (the translation from esse ~ ~gsse~)"24
In so far as the activity ot the esthetic l.ndividual is absorbed
in the intellectual and imaginative appropriation of re;:::ilty, re-

ducing actuality to the possibility of thought, Kierkegaard distinguishes his mode of existence from the inwardness of the ethical individual as an outward action.
Action outwardly directe may indeed transform existence (as
when an emperor conquers the world and enslaves the people a) I
but not the individual's own existence • • • If All such action is theretore only esthetic pathos, and its law is the
law for esthetic relationships in general; the non-dialectical individual transform the world, but remains himself untransformed, tor the esthetic indi vidual never ha s the dialectical within him but outside him, or the individual is
outwardly changed, but remains inwardly unchanged.25

23

~ ••

24
25

-

347-343.

Ibid., 2g~-2g9.
Ibid., 187-3gg.
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The idea here expressed is similar to that ot Saint
~aul:

"If I should speak with the tongues ot men and of angels,

but do not have charity. I have become as sounding brass or a
tinkling cymbal.,,26
The point that Kierkegaard 1s making is that onets external actions may seem to indic_te great achievements in his existential development; but it his "inner life ff2 7 is not transformed by a relationship to the absurd through the appropriation

ot choice. then his development has not progressed beyond the
field of possibility, the esthetio sphere.
For Kierkegaard. the individual whose activity is directed outward, is in the esthetic sphere of existence.

However,

such an individual is not confined to that field of existence.
That field is merely the first step in his existential development.

"The esthetic is unopened inwardness; hence that

i;1

hich is

or should be inwardness must manifest itself as an outward perception."2a Since the outwardness of the esthetic is unopened in...
\"lardness, the actual existence of the esthetic is the potential

existence of the et:lical individual •

..
26 I Cgt- 13. 1.
27

Postsqriat., 367.

26

Ib~d ...

4g2.
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The notes given above are the predominant characteristics which Kierkegaard ascribes to the esthet.ic sphere of existence..

'fhay may be briefly summed up in the following manner •

.c.;xthetie existence is mainly enjoyment; it finds no contradietion
in existing.
lectical.

Esthetic existente is action outward and non-dia.

Its dialectic is

out~ide

itselt.

Esthetic existence i

unopened inwardness, the potentiality ot ethical existence.

Its

operations are mainly in the imaginative and intellectual order.
The principle ot the esthetic sphere of existence is formulated
as follows: No reality 1s thought or understood until its!!!! ha
been resolved to 2°851; reality is reduced to abstract and imaginative thought, which is possibility, not actuality,
In the

sum~ry

above and in the preceding passages ta-

ken trom Kierkegaard. the term
gaard uses it frequently

.~en

q~aleQtic

is used.

Since Klerke-

treating of the spheres ot existenc

it should be briefly considered before the treatment on the ethi ...
cal sphere of existence.
Kierkegaard has already said that the existing individual is a dialectician dealing with existence.

He vigorously

opposes the notion of the dialectic as had in Hegelian philosophy, namely, the mediation of opposites in the sphere of immanence, where the outward is the inward by an identiy ot thought
and being.

Transition in the Hegelian dialectic is effected by a

smooth evolution ot the Idea on a quantitative basis according to
Kif~rke

aard

When he
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opposites in the Hegelian dialectio, he seems to mean that there
is merely a numerical distinction between abstractions.

Sinoe

thought and being are identified in the Hegelian dialectic, the
mediation of opposites by the necessity ot its evolution in Kierkegaardts opinion must be quanittative.

This type ot dialecti-

ca.l immanence will preclude any kind ot tra.nscendence qualitatiYE

ly distinct trom thought since thought and being are identified..
This notion would exclude the possibility ot a transition from
reason to faith for Klerkegaard..

But reality for Kierkegaard 1.

not a mere evolution ot abstractions.

Contrary to this theory of

"the dystem d he posits his existential dialectic which admits a
qualitative distinction between opposites.

Transition from one

opposite to the other is not effected by a mediation ot the two
into a synthesis which necessarily evolved, but rather transitioa
is the

qualitGH~ive

change from one oPPosite or sphere to a.nother.

This transition il effected by a free choice.

By this choice the,

indi vidual changes to another sphere qualitati valy distinct from
its opposite.

This theory leaves room for transcendence, which

for Kierkegaard is :f'aith, the ultimate sphere ot the existing individual.

The decision by which one changes trom one sphere to

another is called the nleap ."

Kie rkegHard expresses himself on

the dialectic in the tollow-ing passage:
From" the abstract point of view there is no decisive conflict between the standpOints, because abstraction removes
that in Which the decision 1nhe~est ~ e!~sting !UbJ§f~.
But in spite of this consideratl.on, the immanent trans tion

64
"I

ot speculative philosophy ia still a chimera, an illusion,

as if it were possible tor the one standpoint necessarily to
d.etermine itself into the other; tor the catego~ll' ot transition is itself a breach of immanence, a leap. lj

The immanent transition ot the "System" was a mere chimera for Kierkegaard.

As he saw it, this transition prohibited

t.he individual from determining itself from one categ;ory to another.

Again, Kierkegaard's point of view 1s the "existing sub-

ject" in whom the decision inheres.

Kierkegaard continues to

comment on the Hegelian dialectio.

t rom the consideration already touched upon
in the preceding, that acoess to the realm otthe historical
1s subject to a quantitative dialectiC • • • • But i;:>.gain and
again to be absorbed i.n this everlasting quantification is
harmful to the observer. who may easily lose the chaste
purity ot the ethical, which dismisses the quantitative in....
finitely with a sacred contempt.30
Vie must abstraot

Kierkegaard now applies the Hegelian dialectic to his
-

problem of becoming a Christian.
For there is no immediate transition from the introduction
to the becoming a Chriat~an. the transition rather constituting a qualitative leap.Jl
Philosophy ofters an immediate introduction to Christianity,
and so do the historical a.nd rhetorical introductions. These
introductions succeed, because they introduce to a doctrine,
but not to becoming a Christian. • •• But if the real diffieulty is to become a Christian, thia being the absolute
decision, the only possible introduction must be a repellent
one. thus preCisely calling attention to the absolute decision. Even the longest of introductions cannot bring the in-

29

IW.,

30

Ibid_, 126-127.

262,

31 Ibid." 34.0.
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dividual'" a single step nearer to an absolute decision. For
it it could, the decision would not be absolute) would not
be a qualitative leap, and the individual v!ould be deoeived
instead ot helped.J2

In the above passage, Kierkegaard is referring to the
introduction to Christianity made by the Hegelians with their
quantitative dialectic.

But inspite of their attempt to recon-

cile Christianity with "the System", Kierkegaard remains steadfast in his proposition that regardless ot how tar one strings
abstractions, they still remain abstractions.

Regardless of how

many mediations or changes are made in that process, those
changes still remain quantitative and not qualitative,

They

still remain in the sphere ot immanence, and ot necessary evolution, not in the sphere of the treely existing individual who
deter"lines himself.

By way ot swrunary, the main points in Kierkegaard t • notion ot the dialectic are as follows, he rejects the Hegelian dialectic with its necessity of evolution, tts quantitative transition, and its preclusion of transcendence, going beyond reason by
a qualitative transition, or by one which 1s effected by

d.cisio~

This decision by which one crosses trom one sphere to another ill

called "the leap."
When the individual makes the transition from the esthe-

tic sphere to his new mode of eXistence. he becomes an ethically

32

Ibtd •• 343
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existing individual.

It has already been seen in the treatment

0

the esthetic sphere of existence that the ethical Gphere is one
of action-victory.

In terms of existence, Kierkegaard puts it in

this way: "The real is an inwardness that is infinitely interestcrl.
in existing; this is exemplified in the ethical individual.")J
Kierkegaard considered the esthetic sphere basically as one
possibility.

or

He now treataot the ethical sphere as the actual.i ....

zation ot that possibility.
Ethically regarded, reality is higher than possibility, The
ethical proposes to do away with the disinterestedness ot
the possible by making existence the infinite interest ••
• • Ethics closes immediately about the individual, and dem~mds that he exist ethically • • • • The ethical lays hold
ot each individual and demands that he refrain from all contemplation especially o.f humanity and the world • • • • Such
et'ilical contemplation is impossible, since there is only one.
kind of ethical contemplation. name41, self-cont~nplation ••
• • For the ethical, a s being the internal, cannot be observed by an outsider, • • • This ethical reulity is the
only reality which does not become a mere posaibioity thro
being known, and which can be known only through being
t.hought; ter it is the individual's own reality, Before it
became a re;;lity it was known by him an the form of a conceived re lity, and hence as a possibility.J4
Kierkegaard in the above passage is bringing out the d
tails of his theory of subjectivity.

The ethical individual is

interested in existence, his own existence.

T~is

interest is the

reJation of the individual to t ruth by thinking it in term. ot
It is the ethical sphere where thought and existence are

"selt."
I

I

r

3)
34.

~.,

289.
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united in the existing individual, not as abstrD.ct thought is related to a cognitive subject but as thoueht related to the individual thinki'ng out his existence.

Kierkegaard formulates the

principle for tho "ethical sphere in this way: "The ethical principle is that no possibility is understood until eaeh
~rords.

become an esse.";5 In other

QOss~

has

thought is not real unless it

is actually related to the existing individual who lives it. Lest
the ethical be contused with any objective study

or

ethics. Kiar-

kegaard qualifies still more his notion of the ethical in terms
of theindividual.

"The ethical is concerned with particular hu-

man beings, and with each and every one of them by himself • • • •
The ethical requirement is imposed upon each individual. and
when it judges, it judges each individual by himselt. w36
14oreover. the knOl..rability of the ethj eal is proper only
to the individual himself,

~3ince

only he can realize it.

nIt can

be realized only by the individual subject, :400 alone can know

\'lhat it 1s that moves within him.,,)7 The point here is similar to

that contained in the saying: you cantt judee a ma.n's ....,nseienc.
but the individual himself is the ultimate judge, God excepted.
The last note of the ethical sphere of existence which we shall
treat Kierkegaard states in terms of the dialectical.

35

Postscti~t.,

.36

Ibid_, 284.

37

Ibid.1i.
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individual is dialectical in himself inwardly in salf-assertion.
hence in such a '-fay that the ultimate basis in not dialectic in
itself t inasmuch as the s elf which is at the basis is used to
overcome and assert itself J then we have the a thieal iD;;¥erRretation,"Jg The meaning of this passage seems to be that it the
individual finds 'n time the coatradiciton

or

eXisting, that is,

basing one's eternal happiness upon something historical, then he
is

ethioally dialectical.

Th(:~

selt-assertion is the discovery

within oneself that the individual is eternal. that is, destined

for ttemal ha.pp:i.ness.

He is dialectical in that he paradoxical-

ly relates himself, a being in time, to thatWlich is eternal. The
ultimate dialectical basis is the absolute pe.radox by which the

eternal has ceme into time.

This dialectical basis is the basis

.for faith, as will be seen in the treat,ment ot the third sphere

of existenoe.

The et:iical individual finds himself in a struggle

to overcome outwardness and to maintain his relation to the ab-

solute telos••

Ethical existence, "essentially struggle and vic-

tory.,39 by its self-assertion 1n inwardness and by its discovery
of the existential contradiction in its relationship to the abso ...
lute talos for its eternal b.appineaa, is propaedeutic to the re-

ligious sphere of existence.

The ethical sphere of existenoe i .

essentially related to the religious sphere of existence.

)8

I,bid., 507 •

.39

Ibid ... 256.
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living ethically one tends to the religious sphere.
Before the last sphara of existence is

co~sidered

as

Kierkegaard saw it, the qualities of the et.ilionl sp;lere of exis-

tence may be summed up as tollows: ethical existence can be realized only by the indlvidual;.ethical existence 18 essentially
struggle and victory in inwardness; the ethicnl interpretation

ot existence is had when the individual is dialectical. that is,
moving roward faith.

'l'he tJ.ltimate basis of this movement ot dia-

lectical inwardness is the s elf used to orercome and a Bsert selt.
Theethical individual finds the contradiction of existenoe (haV'-

ing one's eternal happiness dependent on a relation to something
~listorical)

in self-assertion.

Finally, the ethical principle

is that no possibility is understood until each Eqsse has become

an esse, that is, no truth (possibility in the abstra.ct) is under
stood until one lives it in one's own exist.nc •
The last sphere in Kierkegaardts Bchome is t.he religiou
spher:~

of existence.

Kierkegaard ex)laina the religious sphere

terms of the individual.
inward, is conscious

I1The religious individua.l is reflected

ot being

existentia.~.ly

in process of becom-

ing, a nd yet maintaining a relationship to an eternal
1'hus tar the religious sphere seems to be the
T;~is

5

happiness~

ame a.s the ethical.

is true, a.nd in so far as this much of the religious sphere

40

:I;.~iJ ••

406.
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is the same as the ethical, It is frequently referred to as the
sthiee-religious sphere.

But the note which distinguishes the re-

ligious from the ethical is

ft

sutterIng."

"The religious individu-

al sustains a relationship to an eternal happiness, and the sign
of this relationship is s'utfering, and suffering is its essential
sx.presssion tor the existing inde! vidual. -41

Kierkegaard briefly

explains suffering as he understands it in the preceding passage.

ffFor the suffering is rooted in the !!lct thet he

the religious

individual is separated from his happiness, but also signifies
that he has a relationship to this l'.appiness. so that to be without suffering means to be without religion.,,42
Kierkegaard gives a ,further qu.alification of suffering
as the characteristic trait of the

re11~~1ous

sphere as distinct

from the ethical and esthetic.
This suffering hat; 1'1:;5 grou.nd in the fact that L he individual is in h1s immediacy absolutely committed to relative
ends; its si~nit1eance lies in ehe transposition of the relationship, the dying away from immediacy,4l or in the expression existe,ntially of the principle that the i.;tdividual
can do absolutely nothing of himself. but is as nothing before God; for here ag2in the negative is the mark by which

41 Ibl,a ... 407.
42

~ ••

406.

43 'fhe term ~mmE)dillCi is used by Kierkegaard in opposition to the term r~fle~tIoD'Y it he mea~s the apprehension ot
nature direotly either Sy trie senses or by J.ntuition without reflection. Hence he speaks ot immediacy frequently when he speaks
4~9!h;o1:thetic sphere

of

exist.ence.

cr.

~2st5crie1:t 251, .310.
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the God-relationship is recognised, and self-annihilation is
the eewerltial form of the God-relationship. And this self.
annihilation must not receive an external ex}>ression. • • •
The individual must not allow himself to int~gine that it can
be d.one once for all t for this is 6sthetic.44
From the above passage it can be seen that t.he religiou
sphere is distinct from the ethical in that the God-relationship

is not found wi th self-assertion, which is proper to the ethical
s pherd, nor is it fOu..l1d wi th external expressions

ot the God... re ....

lationshii). ·which is proper to the esthetic as found in religious
poets. ff 45
Besides the characteristics ot the religious sphece already saen. Kierkegaard further qualifies chis sphere by distinguishing two types "religiousness Aft and "religiousness B.tf

In terms of the dialectical Kierkegaard speaks ot religiousness A in -the following manner.

"Religiousness A is the

dialectic of inward trnnsformation; it is the relEltion to
nal happiness which is not conditiJned by anything but is

lectic inward appropriation of the

I'

ala tionship, and so is condi-

tioned only by the i'.1wardness of the appropriation and its dialectlc. ftlt6
In

erms of immanence, a Hegelian term which Kierkegaar

appropriated. chang;ing its

meaninc~

44 Pos\sgr!2t. 412.
45 ~b!d., 347·34~.
46 Ib
494.
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41

~hoM&h~

in being. he explains religiousness A in a new

light.

The religiousness A comprehends the contradiction as suttering in self-annihilation, although with immanence, but by
ethically accentuating the fact or existing i~ prevents the
exister from becoming abstract in immanence. 47
The apprehension of the distinction "here" and "hereafterU
is decisive tor every existence-communication. SP!SR&atil!
rh&r2Sf,U2hX resolves it absolutely into pure being. • •• eIg ousness A, which is not speculative philosophy, but yet
is speculative, reflects upon thi' distinction when it reflects upon what it is to exist. 48
From this passage it can be seen that Kierkegaard posits
as the basis of the God-relationship thought which is related to

the existing individual and is accompanied by suffering.

It is

called the pathetic-dialectic since the individual is unhappy because he is se.parated from his eterneJ happiness but is dialecti-

cally working out the existential contradiction ot an eternal .
happiness based on something in time.

The paradoxical dialectic

ot religiousness B will be based on the opposite of thought, which
is faith.

Hence, Kierkegaard says, "Religiousness A can exist in

paganism."49 Bue he adds this qualification; l1H.eligiousness A
must first be present in the individual before there can be any
question of becoming aware of the dialectic ot B,n50 These words

47 P2!tscri2~' 507.
48 IbiS •• 50e.
4.9 Ibig. J 495.
50 Ibig., 494.
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may be taken'" as another indication that Kierkegaard was not completely irrational in his approach to faith, which for him is the
maximum state ot existence for th& individual.
Paradoxical religiousness, or religiousness B, which
Kierkegaard considers to be true religiousness, is contrasted wit
religiousness A on the point ot'immanence •
. It the individual is paradoxically dialectic, every vestige
o! original immanence being annihilated and all connection
cut ott, the individual being brought to the utmost verge ot
existence, then we have eatadO~1S;r re~ioUin!!I. • • • The
paradoxical religiousness rea s
th
anence and makes
the fact of existing the absolute contradiction, not within
immanence but against immanence. There is no ~onger any
immanent }undamentl kinship between the temporal and the
eternal because the eternal itself hBS entered time and
would constitute there the kinship,'.L
It can be seen from what Kierkegaard writes here that
he is pushing the development ot becoming a Christian in the direction ot .faith.

The relationship by which the existing indivi-

dual dialectically establishes the g rounds for his eternal happiness has as its

~'rmin.

the existing individual as existing in

time, and the eternal, also in time.

'rhe eternal is discovered

in immanence. the inwardness of thought.

In this relationship

proper to religiousness A. the individual does find the contradiction of existence, but it 1s within himself in immanence.
ligiousness B is not so.
itself.

Re-

It finds no eternal determinant within

It establishes a rdlationship which conflicts with all

51

~ •• 507~508.
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understanding.

'l'he paradoxical religiousness defines the distinction ["here
and herealter n] absolutely by accentuating paradoxically
what it is to exist. For as the cernal came into the world
at a moment ot time. the existing individual does not in the
course of time come in to r,ela tion wi th the eternal and think
about it (this is A), but in ~ it comes into relation with
the eternal in ~~. so that ~relation is within time,
and this relatlonih!p conflicts equally with all thinking '52
whether one reflect upon the Individ~l or upon the Deity.

Kierkegaard explains the paradoxical accentuation which
is proper to religiousness B.
The contradiction first emerges in the fact that the subject
in the extremity of such subjective passion (in the ooncern
for an eternal happiness) has to.base this upon an historical knowleege which at its maximum rem.ains an approximation.
• • • But to req\.dre the greatest posnible subjective passion to the point of hating mother and father, and then to
put this together with an historical knowledge, which at its
maximum only can be approxL'11at1on--that is the contradiction.53
Here Kierkeeaard is explaining the contradiction of' exstence in accordance with the principles of knowledge which he
,oaited, namely, that the only reality which one can really know
~.

onets own.

)ecause

All other knowledge at best is an approximation

in the knowine of at.her

thir~gst

8omet~1ng

is omitted by

bstraction--existence.
K1erkegaard further qualifies this sphere of religiousess B in terms ot the individual and the Deity, the individual'.

52

Ibig., 506.

53

Ibig., 510.
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teaoher 54 of existence.
And again the oontradiction is 8. new expression for the tact
existence is paradoxically accentuated; for it there is any
vestige of il1:u:nanenoe, an eternal determinant left in the exister...... then it is not possible.. The exister must have lost
continuity with himself, must have become another (not different from himself within himself). and then by receiving
the eondilion ot the Deity, he must become a new creature.55
Two things to be noted in this passage are the becoming another 01
.....

the exister, and the giving of the condition by the Deity.,

The becomin& C\nothe,X; by the accentuation of the existence ot the God-man is '",hat Kierkegaard meuns by becoming a
Though one be baptized a Christian, and though one

Christian.

know the doctrine ot Christianity, such a person is not a Chris-

tian, in Kierkegaard'So opinion, until he has become another. 'this
final stage in the e xlstential dialectic is not selt-acquired,
since it is outside the realm

of the Deity.

ot self-assertion, but it is a gift

The gitt is the condition for faith.

nally viewed in connection with the absolute paradox.

Faith is fi"Faith is

the objective uncertainty due to the repulsion of the absurd held
fast by the pa.ssion of inwardness, '\.'1hich in this instance is intensified to the utmost degree..

'l'his formula fits only the be-

liever, ..... and solely the believer who is related to the absolute paradox.,,56 One more quot,tinn from Kierkegaard will bring

54 Ibig., 508; also
55

P~stsxriRtJ

56

Ibid., 540.
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Kierkegaard's'" explanation of the problem ot Christianity back to
the s'tarting point ot hi s doctrine.

That, point was the question,

ffAre Christianity and speculative philosophy reconcilable?"

K:1er-

kegaard replies again lifter he has shown theliJaY by which one
should become a Christian.
'fhe datini tion ot what it ia to be a Christian prevents the
erudite or anxious deliberation of approxication from enticing the individual into byways so that he becomes 60 erudite
instead ot becoming a Christian; for the decision lies in the
subject. But inwardnesG has again found its speci.f'ic mark
whereby it is ditferentiated tram all other inwardness and
is not disposed of by the chatty category ot Nquite differentlyff which fits the case ot every passion at the moment ot
passion. n 51
.
The third sphere of existence should not be concluded
before mention is made of two categories which Kierkegaard places
,,;ithin the two types of religious existence.
::~uil t-conseiousness.

The

first catep;ory,

is proper to reli;iousness A; the seconi.

sin-consciousness, is proper to paradoxical religiousness.
According to Kierkegaard, guilt-consciousness is the
tfdecisive expression for the existential pathos.r,5S Kierkegaard
speaks more fully on this notion in connection with eternal happiness.
But how can the consciousness of guilt be the decisive expression for the relationship of an exister to an eternal
happiness, and this in such a way that every exlster who has

57

1&i4_,

,g Ib:t£., 469.
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not this consciousness 1s ~ i~ not related to his eternal
happiness? IDne might think-t~th1s consciousness is an
expression of the tact that one is not related to it, the
decisive expression of the faet that one is lost and the relationship is relinquished. The answer is not difficult.
Precisely because it is the exister who is to relate himself
while guilt is at the same time the most concrete expression
for the relationship • • • • Guilt is the expression for the
strongest selt-ass$rtion of existence • • • • 59
Guilt consciousness
constitued in reliziousness A.

i~

the expression ot the relation

Kierkegaard says this in another

manner.

rtThe consciousness of guilt still lies essentially in
iramanence. rt60 It is a "higher expression of this relationship ot
the individual to eter lal happiness than is suffering,,,!>l Guilt

consciousness is acquired by the individual through his freedom.
And in the sufferingot guilt consciousness, guilt at onoe
assuages and rankles. It assuages bee use lt is an expre ..
sion of freedom as t.his is found in the religious sphere,
where the positive 1s reg~gniZeable esthetically: freedom
recognizable by freedom.
cl ere Klerkegaard. seems to be

making the point that tIde expressio

of the relationship of the incli vidual to eternal happiness contnins two aspects.

One is that the guilt consciousness 1s pathe-

tic in itself by virtue of the individual's being infinitely oon-

59

Ib~g.,

60

l.l?i:.9.. , 474.

4'10.

61 Ib~d. , 475.
62 Ibig.

carned in baing separated from his eternal happiness.
aspect guilt rankles.

Under this

It assuages, however, in that the indivi-

dual perceives that this expression of the pathetio based on hi.
relationship to the eternal is due to his freedom. his free decisiveness.

This he has lJosited by the selt-sGsertion of his

ethico-religious existence.

Moreover, guilt-consciousness is

found only in the sp ere of immanence where the individual has
made the decision of relating himself to an eternal tlappiness.
Consciousness ot sin 1s distinct from guilt-consciousness and is proper to reli&iousness B.

Similar to the expression

of the religiousness of immanence, sin-consciousness "is the expression for the paradoxical transformation of existence.

Sin 1s

the new existence-medium. n6)
Kierkegaard further distinguishes these two categories
by

the way in v;-hich the individual acquires them.
Henee the individual is unable to aoquire sin-consciousness
himsQlf", as he can guilt-consciousness; for in guilt-consciousness the ldenti ty of the subject ~"i th himself is preserved. and sin-consciousness, on t he other hand. is an alteration of the very subject himself, \mich shows that outside of' the individual t'iha t power must be \<,,111ch makes clee1r
to him the fact that in coming into life he has become
another than hg,was. has become a ::.:;inner. 'l'h1s power is the
Deity in time. It

by

From the above treatment of Bin-consciousness, a deeper
insight into religiousness .B can be had.

6)

lbig., 516.

64 lW., 517.

Basically Kierkegaard
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is saying the same thing that he said concerning paradoxical reIt is the sphere where the individual is related

ligiousness.

paradoxically to the Deity. which is the poyer outside the existing individual 8i ving to the exi s tel' the e<mdi tion to become

another by faith, to accentuate another's existence-tela t ot the

God-man.

(the

eXIr

ession of the' pat

ship is called sin-consciousness.

lOS

involved in this relation...

The ere£', ture, the existing

subject before the eternal in time, is annihilated and is absolutely different from God.

'rhe greatest point of difference be ....

tween God and theexister is sin.
Further treatement on the doctrine of religiousness is
found in K1erkegaard's

Feat and

Ttem£'~Il&.

the later ,;~o~rnal~b P!~irer. T[aining
Discourses.

:'\i S

.sn

~a.t,

Life'.!

Christian!tx;,

E:;Uty'"

It shou.ld be noted that Kierkegaard intended to stop

IWriting with the publication of the
him by

!a

Stag!!

r.o~t!S'lri2Si.

But attacks upon

a weekly publication, The CQl'saJ.r. forced him to take up

pen in defense of himself' fJ

The,"orks whlc;1 loll owed were

almost entirely ('eligiou8 in character.

A t r8atment of the spheres of existence in Kierkegaard
~ould

not be cCimplete if mention of the two Ifzones" of existence

iIlere not made.

rtT~"iere

are thus three spheres of existence:

t

••

two boundary zones correspond to these: irony, constituting the

boundary between the esthetic and the et''lical; humor, as the boun-
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dary that separates the ethical from the religious_,,6, Irony,
which is an intermediate stage between the esthetic and the ethical 1s defined by

Kierkeg~lard

in the follolrJing way.

Irony is a synthesis ot ethical passion which infinitely accentuates inwardly the person of the individual in relation
the the ethical requirement and of culture, \mich infinitely
abstracts externally from the personal J&2. as one finitude
among all the other finitudes and partic\ilarities. This abstraction causes the emphasis in the first attitude to pass
unnoticed. and herein lie. the art of the ironist which
also insures that the first movement shall be trui y infinite
The masses of men live in the converse manner; they are concerned to be something when somebody is looking at them;
they are if possible something in their own eyes when others
observe them; but im'(ardly when the absolute requirement
looks in upon them there they have no taste for accentuati
their own persons. 66
Irony, then,according to Kidrkegaard is "an existential
determlnation,ft67 that is, it is a passion which follows upon the
irmnedii'lcy of the esthetic sphere and which accentuates the exis-

tential contradiction, the ethical requirement in self-assertion.
This is what

KierkegLh~rd

means by the Itfirst movement shall be

truely infinite."

This is the inward aspect of irony, its exis-

tontial quality.

But it also has a rererence to externality. !hi

referenoe c onsti tlltBs its cultural aspect.
kegaard means a development

or

61

I,bf~.

68

Ibis! •• 450.

aul ture here ... KieI'-

the psersonality of the individual

in spirit. 61!

66 Po§tsgr'Jr_.

By

449~50.
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'l"he cultural or external a spect of irony is what distinguishes
the truly ethical individual from people who are not inwardly interested in tbeir existence.

The irony consists in the tact that

the ironist is not interested with what he appears to be externally, as is the case ususlly 'with most people. but he is interested with his inward reality.

He may appear to the observer to

be interested in the activity of externality, but the irony of it
is that he is interested in the opposite,
irony as the ino,ggnt!i2

or

the ethicist.

Kierkegaard reters to
He explains this,.

But why does the ethicist use irony as his incgiRitg1 Because he grasps the contradiction there is between the manner in which he exists inwardly and the tact that he does
not outwardly express 1t. For the ethioist does indeed re.
veal himself. in 80 tar as he pours h1mself forth in the
tasks of tac:tual reality 1n which he lives; but this is
something that the immediate individual also does! and what
makes him. an ethicist is the movement of' the ~,pir t by which
he sets his outward life inwardly in juxtaposition with the
infinite requirement of the et hical. and this i . something
that is not direotly apparent. 69
This explanation ot irony is consistent with Kierkega.srd's theDry of' subjectivity.

It is another explanation of the

subjective, existiing individual who is infinitely interested in

his existence and his eternal happiness.

'l'he notion 0.£ irony was

always very interesting to Kierkegaard, especially in connection
with his study of Socrates, his pagan prototype.
masterts thesis on

lh! Cqnce2t 2! Ironx

..•
69

Ibi5l.

~tth

He wrote his

Congtant Ret!renct

82
Hum.or, the corresponding sone of existence, is the intermediary stage between the ethical sphere and the religious

sphere.

Kierkegaard explains it in this way:

So a g:ain in the case of the humorist and the religious individual since according to the foregoing the dialectic of
the religious sphere itself'forbids direct expression. forbids the outward differenoe by which recognition could be
effected, protests against the assumed commensurability of
the external, • • • the humorous • • • sets tho God .... idea
into conjunotion with the other things and evokes the oontradictiont but he does not maintain a relationship to God
in terms or religious passion !~riite s1c diytul. he trans.corm s '1.1mselt il1stead into a e.t~ng an(l yet profound exchange-center for all these transactions but he does not
himself stand related to God. The relig l OUS man does the
same, he sets the God-idea into juxtapoxition with everything and sees the contradiQfion, but in his inmost conscious
ness, he is related to God.7
Humor

again 1s that whereby the existing individual re-

lates the f'a.cts of externality to the God-idea. but by this rela..
tion the individual himself is not related to the God-idea.
Hence, Kierkegaard distinguishes this zone of existence from real
religiousness by placing it in a pOSition propaedeutic to the
latter.

In explaining. humor, he admits that external tects will

have some rels.tion to the raligious individual.

The dialectic

of the religious sphere itself forbids reference outward and permits only to the inwardly existing individual in his subjeotivity
.. ,.

70 Reidar Thomte, Kierkeglatsl'..! PhilosoBhZ S!t. ReJ,ig1qn,
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CHAPTER I

SORSN A.

lI~KEGAARD

Born May 5, 19lJ in Copenhagen. Spren Aabye Kierkegaard
a period ot Denmarkts history which was at once

ente~ed

poll~1-

cal11 disintegrating and reviving in the field ot literature.
the year of Kierkegaardts birth Denmark went bankrupt.

In

A few

yearS prior to his birth the British fleet bombarded Copenhagen
and seised the Dano-Norwegian fleet.

In the year atter his birth

the Vanish.Norwegian union was dissolved.
birtl1 the celebrated sculptor. Bertel
three years old.

In the year of his

'lhor~ialdsen,

'Was forty-

Adam Gottlob Oehenschlaeger. outstanding as the

greaitest of Danish romantic poets, and Hans Christian Anderson,
equally famous for his fairy tales, were his contemporaries in

1

Denms. rk •

The religiou6 atmosphere ot his time was saturated with
Lutheranism, which was the religion ot the Established Church in
Denmsrk.

The ,theology of his day had been shot through with He-

gelian philosophy. which was the rage in Germany and Denmark at

1 For more historica.l data on Kierkegaard's backfrouna,
reader is referred to David Swensonts work. S2!!!llih'M bgu~
Kierke~a~rdt Minneapolis, 1941. 1-)1.
the

1

..,
r.eference to the external.

Kierkegaard refers to this expression

of the religious individual related to externality as humor because it is based on the comical, that is, an incongruity.

This

incongruity he explain.s as follows:
The comical is brought out when the hidden inwardness comes
into relationship with an euvironment. in that the religious
individual comes to hear and see that which ~men brought
into conjunction with his inllard passion produces the comic
errect. Hence even when two religious individuals converse
with one another, the one will produce a comic impression on
the other. for each of them will constantly have his own inwardness 1n mind, and will now hear what the other says in
the light of this, and hear it !.J.8 comical t because neither
dares directly express themcret ot inwardness; at moat they
will entertain a suspicion o.r one another because of the
humoristic undertone.72
.
Kierkcgaardts explanation of the humorous and thE! comical is consonant l,1ith his previous explanation of subject.ivity
and ethical truth,

Truth cannot be oommunicated directly but

only indirectly since in the process ot knowing something, one
must abstract from existence.

Since existence is the reality ot

the ethical individual. and since the existential relation to the
absurd is the reality

or

the religious individual, it is clear

that these re.lities cannot be communicated directly to another
individual.

Communication with others must therefore be indirect

and the passion which accompanies this indirection in connection
with the ethical sphere is irony, and in connection with and preparatory to the religious sphere is humor.

,.
72 Ibiq •• 457.
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Irony and humor are the last of the more important qualitis. \'/hich Kierkegaard att.ribu.tes to the .t"'.Jli;:;ious sphere ot
existence.

The religious sphere of existence in briaf might be

summed up as follows: there are

tt.'iO

Ligiousness A. and religiousness B.

selt-annihilation before God.
ence.

types of religiousness, re-

Religiousness A is d stined aa

Lt is held 1n the sphere of imman-

Paradoxical reliJ;iousness, or religiousness B. is had \"ihen

the individual is pa:radoxically dialectic (by faith alone). and
every vestige of original irmnanence (thought in being) is annihilated.

At this point the individual is at the utmost verge ot

existence.

This is the sphere

timata stage in the dialectic.

or

transcendence" .faith. the ul-

Suffering is proper to t he reli-

gious sphere, which is based on the positing of one's eternal
happiness upon an approximation (the historical truth, the absurd,
the paradox), a thing which can be done only when one haa in oneself no eternal determinant, and hence t.his again Is connected
~lth

~tion

the paradoxical accentuation of existence.

By the accentu-

of the contradiction in the paradoxical relation, the indi-

!vidual loses continuity with selt and becomes another as a creature created to bocome

tion.

Ii

Christian.

'fhis is the miracle of crea-

Hence the Christian lives in faith dependent on God and the

paradox tor his eternal happiness.

There are two zones in the spheres of existence, that of
~rony

and that of humor.

The first is theaKternal appearance of

I

'f.-l

85
the ethicist. 'Nho seems to be concerned with externality. but ao ...
tually and ironicc,lly is only concerned with l1is own existence.
Llhe latter, humor, is the expression of the religious indiV'idual
t"tlho is related to extornc:l t;!ings.

to h1r'1 by an incongruity.

External things are related

For the religious individual always

has his inwardness in mind.

Whatever is comrnunicated to him pro-

duces a COfnic effect. ::since he knows that nothing can be communicated to h1m directly.

The two categories lound in religiousness A and religioksness B respectively are guilt-consciousness and sin-consc!
ness.

Thase are the expression of the pathos which the creature

teels before the ;1bsutd.

T:-ds feeling results trom the relation

established by each type of religiousness.
TIle entire theory of Kierkeg ard might be summarized in

its broadest outlines as follows: he is presented with a probl
how to beco;,le a Ohristian.

He

r'~jeets

an explanation by Hegelian

speculative philosophy because it is a philosophy without existence.

The objective approach is likewise invalid since it ab-

stracts trom eXistence, and cannot reprQsent reality as it is actually but only as it is potentially.
subjectivity.

His solution is posited in

His subjectivity is one in which the individual is

solely interested in his own

exist~mce.

The greatest concern

his existence 1s his eternal

.ha~.piness.

This happiness he as-

sures himself by constituting a relation with the God-man.

or

This

'"I

relation is established by faith which is the "crucifixion of understanding. n Faith is the ultimate stage of the dialectical
mOVCffif.mt

throuGh various spheres of existence.

'l'ho changes

throughout the dialectic are effected by decisiveness or the free
will of the existing individual.

Ultimately the individual ar-

rives at the utmost verge of enstence by a final f'leap" (an act

of deaisi veness by \'rhich one ~?;oes from one sphere to another).
This last "leap" is the act

ot faith.

l·:ost of the major points and parts of Kierkegaard t s

theory of' existence have been prensnted in this thesis.
been taken for the most part from the Postscrip~. Kiel'kegaard's
most philosoph! ),;ark.

A further study of ti"h:se points may be mad

from different pointa of view such as Kierkegaard assumed in hi.
other works.

Before this thesis is concluded, a brief criticism

of Kierkegaardts theories is in order.
low immediately in the next ohapter.

This criticism will tol-

CHAPTER V
CRITICISM OF KIZRKEGAARD'S PHILOSOPHY
The purpose ot this criticism is to determine in some
degree the value of Kierkegaardfs theory of existence from the
standpoint ot experience and from the point ot consistency within
his own system.
A point ot cardinal importance in the theory ot Klerkegaard is his ethico-religious point ot view.

Viewing reality

only trom this standpoint, Kierkegaa.rd concerned himself with that
aspect of reblity which would have bearing on his practical probleM--how to become a Christian.

Because of this point ot view,

he wa::,; solely conerned with the practical aspect

or

reality, not

with the speculative.
It was this point ot view which gave Kierkegaard so
great an advantage in his a"ttack upon Hegelianism.

Using the

standpoint of the individual and ot existence as his basis of attack upon Hegelia.nism, Kierkegaard was in a very apt position to
reject a speculative philosophy ot essences which destroyed that
about which Kierkegaard was most conserned--the existence ot the
indi vidual.

~

In the speculative philosophy ot Hegel, Kierkegaard
found no help for his problem ot existence.

Kierkegaard was well

aware that mants paramount problem in existence is the problem ot
Christianity.

Each individual must attain his final end, eternal

happiness, and he must attain it through Christianity by relating
himself to Christ.

In this Kierkegaard is right,

In the speculative philosophy at Hegel, however, lier....
kegaard realized that there was no room even tor the possibility

or

l

Christianity. /Christianity is concerned with the individual

and his relation to Christ.

But in Hegeliani_ there is little

empha.sis put on the individual.

The "Syst_" is what counts.

[-

'Christianity 1s concerned with the particular differences ot inl

dividuals and the various ways by which each one strives for his
eternal happiness •.. The "System" is busy with the classification

ot the species ot reality with little concern for the differences
in man which arise from existence.

The individual is absorbed in-

to the "System" and loses his identity as a Christian in the all-

embracing identity of thought and being.

It is easy to see the

reason for Kierkegaard's antagonism toward this philosophy ot
idealism which showed such scant understanding of a primary as!pect of reality-the existence of the individual.

In this res-

pect Kierkegaard is justified in his attact on Hegel.
Kierkegaard was so Ooncerned with destroying the Hege.

lian philosophy of essences, however. that he fell into a position

which was the extreme opposite ot Hegelianism, a philoaophy ot
!
existence completely divorc$d trom essenee. I Kierkegaard's "ac/

tion to

Hegel~anism

was so violent that he made two mistakes-

that of underrating speculative philosophy and ot overrating exThis, again, was largely due to his utter concern with

istence.

the practical problem of becoming a Christian.

In underrating the value of speculative philosophy,
Kierkegaard constructed a theory ot exi stence w hleh lacked a meI

taphysiealfoundation. /Existence
.for Kierkegaard is the ethical
i
re<"llity

or

the individual.

It is the consciousness ot the indi-

vidual through reflection on his own existence.
a

~stant

Finally, it is

striving of the individual toward a relation with the

infinite through faith,
What Kierkegaard says her.;) is true in a sense

r rom

the

standpoint ot Christian asceticism, and from a purely ethical and
psychological point of view, it he presupposes the necessary
loundation ot a speculative philosophy which gives validity to
these notions in their own order.

But the entire tone ot Kier-

kegaard'. writings seems to indicate that he made no such suppositions.

Having rejected the philosophy of Hegel, he sa_s to

identify all speculative philosophy with that particular ph1losophy ot

eS~Hmees.

j,

\:Hence his conceptional existence 1s limited to

the practical order.

It is merely the repetition ot the acts of

volition. reflection. consciousness, and thinking ot the indivl-
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dual.

These acts are meaningles$ unless they are the acts of an

ethical being, one who has a human essence and a corresponding
act of existence.

Such an individual. in order to act as one

ethically concerned with his existence, must be conceived as a
person endowed with reason, tree will, and the power to use the ••
faculties which tlow trom his human essence.

But to all appear-

ances, Kierkegaard gives no such foundation tor his theory ot existence, ,and actually seems to do away with any such presuppositions when he rejects speculative philosophy as phantom, and ab2tract thought as the medium ot pure possibility_
Kierkegaard shows no concern with

~ha~

is existing, but

only with the acts of existence in the individual.
him to a form of psychological subjectivism.

This leads

In other words.

Aierkegaard has a form of philosophy which includes a.ll forms ot
truth within the individual.

By this position Kierkegaard rules

out the possibility of an epistemology and psychology which allow and eXplain an intmtional order by which the individual comEU
in contact with. and grasps hold of, reality which is outside the
individual.

Such a philosophy immediately precludes the possibi-

lity ot the individual to

Ii ttain

truth which lies beyond his onn

person. and restricta him to the realm of his own.l.&2-

It cuts

otf any contact of the individual with the existence ot other beinga, and destroys not only the existence of a ;)hilosophy which
embraces all of reality, but even the possibility of attainin.g a

91
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a speculative foundation for such a philosophy.

Any objective

body or truth will be meaningless to the ir"!di vidual who has cut
himself from the very means by

~nich

such truth can

be

attained.

Yet it is evident from experience that we know other beings as
existing, and trom this knowledge, once it has become general and
speculative, we know more about'our individual existenoe.

lier-

kegaard may have ended in this subjectivism beoause he was eoncerned with a psychological analysis of the workings of his own
soul. and this preoccupation may hsye blinded him to the reality
of existence outside him.
Kierkegaard speaks of existence as a oonstant stri-

~~'hen

ving and becoming, he seems to take for granted the speculative

If he does not take this foundation
hen he has a form at Heracliteanism in wbich all re

foundation which he rejects.
tor granted,

t

ality is becoming and there·is no permanence. \1£ for Kierkegaard
existence is merely the succession ot the inward acts of the individual, a repetition ot the moment a2K. then there 1s no subject to give permanence for the identity of the individual.

Kier.

kegaard speaks of the iadi vidual as though he vlere the subject in
which the acts of inwardness and becoming inhere.

But he has lai<

no .roundation for such an assumption, and seemingly has rejected
the possibil! ty

or one.

By

assuming the ethical point ot view

as an adequate view ot all reality, Kierkegaard cut himself off
trom the possibility of arriving at any doctrine ot substance
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which could have given to him a foundation for his observations
on the ethiaal order of reality.

From the standpoint of Christi.

ani ty, Kierkegaard constructed a philosophy of the prnctioL=!.l or..
del' only.

But a philosophy of the practical order of ree,lity

,dthout a philosophy of the basis of reality is like a castle

built on sand.

A practical philosophy without roots in a specula-

tive philosophy which investieates the causes, standards, and the
basis ot the practical Or'der,

~annot

give an ultirllate reply to the

questions which arise from an adequate view ot all reality.
Kierkrgaard conceived Christianity and the problems involved in
it as though it were divorced from the basic principles which are

essential to Christianity itself.
speculative knowledge

or

Christianity without a basic

truths such as causality, neceSSity,

contingency, finite and inlinite being. substance and accident,
and finality, to mention some, would be ditf'icult to explain.<
But Kierkegaard would h.?ve no system such a s a related
study of these aspects of reality implies.

He says there can be

no system that is existential, but that there cant.'. a logical
system of essences.
possibility ot a

t

Again, his Hegelian background precludes the
ird explanation of reality--one based on the

combination of essence and existence in being.

Kierkegaardts ex-

clusion of an existential system seems to indicate that he wants
either an existence without an essence, the basis ot pennanenee,
or else acts ot existence without substance.
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In tlH) first case, from experience one knows that one
cannot conceive existence without implicj.tly conceiving that
which exists.

In the second case, ·the individual kno,,!s that ther

is a permanent subject, the

en~,

wi!ich performslihe psychological

acts of which it is consciousness.

tion of the moment ll2l!'

Grant that 'there is a repeti-

The intlivldual is still conscious that

the present moment of inwardness is his aot just a.s was the pre-

viou$ moment of inward.ness.

K1erkegaard. no doubt, would have

little interest in this philosophies.l analysis of' his concept or

existenee.

But if his thoory is to have any validity, then such

philosophical suppositions must either be established or taken
for granted.

By limiting truth to the confines of the individual,

and by restricting existence in the individual to his acts of inwardness, he ooemfl to have rejected any 6peculetive a.pproach to
his problem, and to have reduced the individual -to t.he instability of his repeated acts of inwardness devoid of any preinciple

In keeping with his po:i.nt of view, Klorkegaard 8Rserts
that only the e t,hically existing subject and <jot the cognitive
subject is the re,l subject.

speculative

cism.

knO\dt~dge,

Consis Gent

\I.t thhis

rejection ot

Kierkeeat,rd\ere implies a pa.rtial skepti-

He completely rules out pure thought, but grants some va-

lidity to abstract thought.

But the validity which he grants ab-

stract thought in itself' seems to be useless since abstract
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or real! ty.
hold or realtty

thought cannot gi va a v,,,lid presentation
cla.ims that abstract thoup;ht can get

K!erkegaa.rd
only by nul-

lifying it, and this nullification consists in transforming it
into possibility.

The reason .for thl0 is that

Ki~Jrkegaard

admits

that the individual can only know actual reality as possibility •.
Reality as actuality is not known by the ex5.sting individual" be-

cause thought abrogates existence.

Rea.1i ty for Kierkeganrd is

not the all embracing ambit ot being, that which is or can be, bu
merely that which is the existence of the individual.

This theo-

ry of knowledge seems to be the co nsequence of his the ory of exis.
tence according to which the individual is interested only in his
own existende.

But if' the individual cannot attrin rea11ty

8S

it

11, then he c·f:tn never attain any objective truth outside himself.
This skepticism is at least one of the reasons which forced Kiarkegaard to seek ultima.tely an irrational s:>lutlon t.o his problem
in at faith which

\I.~as

divorced from reason.

This postula.te

ot

f'aith in his theory of knOt-fledge is another aspect of the psyChological subjecti vi em to which Kierkeg,;;,ard reduced himself'.

By

rejecting an objective approach to reality, Kierkegaard shut h:tm-

self' off trom any objeotive truth, and concemned himself to some

form of exaggerated subjectivism.
Spe!"~k1ng

of truth, Kierkegaard says that

Wien the (r~HaS

tion of truth is raised in an objective manner, reflection is directed objectively to the truth, as an object to which the knower
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If only the <)oject to '.•!h1c11 r:e is related is the

is I"elated.
truth.

subject is accounted to be truthful.l'.';)n the ques-

t;'~e

tion of the truth i3 rcdsed subjectively, reflection is

subj Gcti vely to the
w;-:;ut is kno'J.m.

nf:~ ture

d:trf~cted

\)f the inrii vidUftl t s rela. tion;3;dp to

If only the mode of the relationship is

t'f~u.a.t

the

inJ,i vidual is truthful even if 'he should be rela.ted to ,,,hat is
not true.
:CLere Kierkegaard showa that is not concerned with an

objecti ve stande:rd of truth.

Any SL.lch disregard for obj ecti VEl
,

truth can only lead to a fom of relativism. for the only standard left by which truth may be detc!rmined iethe individual ..

Even it good faith be supposed in the individual, it is hard to
S0a how anything but anarch~ and chaos eould result from 3uch a
philo~ophy.

It there are as fl.i.any standards for truth as there

are exist,ing individuals. and if the individual t a actions are to
be determined by subjecti 'fe truth alone, then any such thIne aD
an ordered society is out, of the queatdon.

Such a relativism

. \'lould possibly beget as ma.ny forms of Christianity
individuals trying to be Christi;:;,ns.
Po ssibl11ty that some such rorms of

;'-'I.S ther~ ;;.trQ

There w'ould even he thH
C~lr:istialli ty

"muld cnnl,ra-

dict otbers.

Ki,;:rkegaard says the t he is not

<~o':lcern8d

with the

of' Christianity, but with the how of becoming a Christian,

he states in

tet'l.'lG

or

~

Here

Christ-ianity the relativism which he states
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above in terms of knowledge 4

:Ienee. if he \tlere conuistont, Kier-

kee·::,ard sho\;,ld reject the.bjec t.l ve tea::dngs of Ghrist as he did
other specula.ti va and ,)hj:;ct:i. ve

knO't~l0dGe.,

In this case it is

di.~ficult

to see how the ind:i.vidual CQuld become a Ch::'istian in

any way.

Kicrkegaard j in(Jead, states tha.t he take;;.) for

the objective truth of Christic:ln.ity.
to see is that the

how of bocoming a

~

J:~anted

But ;'1:'lHt he does not seem

or truth of Christianity determines 'the

C~.ristian.

If the acts by wIdell the individual

becomes e Christian are to lead

himl~o "'11

end outside hinmelf J

then such acts must be directed by knowledge (if rt3Hllty outside
But Kierkegaard h£w precluded t;his l:ossibility

the individual.

by rejecting any rat1.onnl npproach to reality or to Christianity.
Hence, again, he is reduced to a form of irrationalism ,,.rhich ends
in the bl:tnd leap of fa.ith.

0uch B blind leap is the logical

C('flsequence of his theory of existence and knovlledge; but daily
experience teaches us that a blind leap

ot

~,iB

usually found in the custollwry (:lctions of men.

nature is not
Before one puts

faith In anyone or a.nythine. he usually seeks motives and reasons
tor so doing.

These motives

~lnd

reasons are not :"'olltld in Kier ...

kegaard's theory.

Kierke.c.nard claims ths t 'the individual ca.nnot know the
existenoe of another outside

hl~5elf.

But hiB entire doctrine

points at, and culminates In. the existence
not proved.

A?:ain, if

iH3

or

God, \.,h.ich he has

taKes t:lis exis(:,ence for granted. then

)7

to speaking about it.

Siflilarly, Kit:rkeGaal"d seem,s 'co

~'"e

incon-

sf stant Nhen he t.!ishes to ostabl.i sh n rela'cion to the Dod-X':ml"

cept by a;\proximation ( a,nd thic in not a lmol'!ledce of cln exL:;ting
subject as

13 pch

) then he in estnblishing a relc'i tion to

which acc:ordine to hls

Ol'm

theory is

non-c~dstent HS

somet~b,ing

far ()s be

lacon,earned"
Another seemine inconsistency in Kicrkegciard is brcu£ht

up in conneetj,on wi tt> hi.s t,heory of corrununlcat.lon.

He clairns

that the exiating individual can communicate I<'it'h another individual only indirectly.
irony and humor.

This is ef.fected by a,'IH'oxlmatlon through.

Such a relation seems to be unt,mable if the

individual ean only attain his own existence. and if thO<lght abrogates existence.

Even if such a relation is

indireot.~ow

can

such a relation be directed to an exintent person ..,ho is knolfl1
only as a pO$sibl11 ty?

possible t ..~rm~.!l~,) since they are in difi'f3rent ordars.
ke~Aard "/~ s

~d th

Actual relations cannot be 0ustalned
Here

K~er

faoed with the obvious i'aet that ! )eo1"1e talk to one

ana ther f and thrtt such eo.'P,.rnuniaa tion is eff'ected by ",'orda and
ideas which actually stand tor reality as it is.

Bitt once he had

posited his theory of subjective existentiali.sm and of abrogation

.

of existence by thought, tHo! could not explain a fac-t,

whic~l

is so

individual C:lnnot be knm'!il1 by the existIng illdi'{L':ual, h9 $eems

~artensen,

and ths advsrsaries

'~ho

assailed him in tta :ors2i[_

te ·:!onfin·!s of hIs O'wn psychological ext:Jer12l1ce, does not tIt

The final staJ:s of existence in Kierkegaardts theory
w~ich

brings up another difficulty
culative philosophy.
tion to the absolute
v incl:, and as

~.h... ch

hot-t can such a

can only be

9xplain~d

by 3pe-

By falth the individual i,;}sr.ablishe3 a r;:!la ....

But it existence is a constant stri-

V~191.

rules out permanence of un e _"ist':'l1g subj Qct,

relat~ion

exist?

Finite relat.ions

ject of inhormlce, since such relnvions are

or

have

Qrdinat~ions

t.hing Hhich is, r.ot of somethiu£; which is m-:..;rely

event'.) establish 30,ae sort

!llUSt

11

su.b-

of so:na-

beco~ing.

Hence

.alidity .for tIle blind leap of

faith. Kierkegaard must presuppose a.

philosoph~r

in

~I/'hich

thel"e i8

rOOlll for an exL'3ti!& p€rlnanant subject int"lhich :.he a eta oJ: becom

ing a Christian maJ inhere.
To sum up this criticism, we may say that Ia;arkegaard

ade two fundamental mistakes.

He underrated epeculative philo-

OP~IY

His ethico... n~li:~ious approach to

and over-rated existence.
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realit.y iJlindad him t.o t.he fu.ll view of l'ealitiy i.l.ud cOll..l.'ined. him

merely to
tiialiSla

ethical aspect.

th~

preauppo~es

he rejects.

.1i;;> tn.aory of suojective existen-

the basis oi' a spacula t,.;i.ve philosoptlY which

His theory of knowled'::;;8 involves

(1

partial skepti-

cism, and limit.s the knowledge of ri:iality as it is to the confine

of i;.he existing individual.

This akEilpticiSDl in turn results in

relativism since truth is only subjective.

Ii

That is truth is

found only in the relaLion of the existing subject to something
that~

is known.

That which is known and to which the subject 1s

related rnay be true or false objectively and. as such cause the in
dividual little Goocern,

'l'his relativism causes Kierkegaard to

be inconsistent when he tries to explain tlhe fact of communicatio
and the rela.tion of tine individual to the absolute tel'll.
In conclusion. it may be said that Kierkegaard rejected

the very foundaLions which col.ild have given validity to his ohse.l'vatiohs on the e t~lical existence of the individual.
tr~.ue

His doc-

is HotL.O be taken as a special branch of philosophy: which

has as its funa.al aim only the explanation of ethical realit.y.
Kierkegaard himself seems to make the e trlical reality the only r

ality that can be known and w ich has value.

To take this doc-

trine thus as an adequate pitilosophy of reality is to mistake the

part for the whole.
If one would grant the validity of the above criticism.
he would be led to conclude, after seeing the defects

ot Kierke-
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exiQt.~ncet un epi>3temology to explain

led",,;e

or

t.he .lCLlidity of wants know-

rauli ty f a psychology t.o explain {[,an f s knowledlbe of him-

~elf and ti:.l.e ..""orkings of ilis .i.'&.cull.,ies, hnd a natlJ.!'al t:.i.t.::olvbl t.o

prove teJ.e exlSi.;,twca of God and explain '11an' 5 .c·elati0H tu God.
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